plant has neither been completed nor even put into operation. Meanwhile, the
Fukushima nuclear disaster triggered by a potent earthquake with a magnitude 7. 1
and the ensuing tsunami on March 11 , 2011 in Japan has significantly changed the
perceptions of the Taiwanese people on the safety of nuclear power plants. Taiwan,
like Japan, is located at the intersection of the Philippines Sea Plate and the
Eurasian Plate, prone to earthquakes. More and more people expressed concern
and began to oppose the fourth nuclear power plant. On March 9 , 2013 , about two
hundred thousand people, including those who had never been outspoken on this
issue, staged street protests island-wide against the completion of the fourth nuclear
power plant. In responding to this unprecedented popular opposition, the KMT
government – although in the past strongly against the use of public referenda on
the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant – is now proposing to put forward
a popular vote on whether to complete and operate the fourth nuclear power plant.
J.Y. Interpretation No 632 is another example of strategic avoidance by the
Constitutional Court. The partisan confrontation between the KMT legislative
majority and the DPP government was exacerbated as President Chen entered his
second term in 2004. The most serious legislative boycott took place during the
confirmation of the Control Yuan commissioners, functional equivalents to
modern-day ombudsmen. According to the Constitution, commissioners are
appointed by the president with legislative confirmation. Yet it is not clear whether
the president or the Legislative Yuan is vested with the primary decision-making
power regarding the nomination. The KMT legislative majority argued that, based
upon the parliamentary system, President Chen must consult with legislators on the
list of nominees prior to nomination. But the DPP government opposed such
consultation, contending that, due to the presidential system, the president enjoyed
the power of nomination alone while the Legislative Yuan was provided with the
power of confirmation.
As the third term of the Control Yuan commissioners expired at the end of January
2005 , President Chen submitted a list of nominees for legislative confirmation by the
end of 2004. However, the KMT legislative majority blocked it from entering floor
discussion for an entire year. In February 2005 , a newly elected legislature, where the
KMT still enjoyed a majority, was inaugurated. President Chen submitted the list
again, but the KMT continued the boycott for another three years. At the request of
the DPP legislators, the Constitutional Court rendered J.Y. Interpretation No 632 in
August 2007. Again, without deciding on the question which institution – the
president or Legislative Yuan – was the primary decision-maker, the court simply
stated that the Legislative Yuan must exercise the consent power in a timely manner
to maintain the constitutional functions of the Control Yuan and directed the issue
to be resolved appropriately in accordance with its decision.
21
Regrettably,
(^21) J.Y. Interpretation No 632 ( 2007 ), available atwww.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/
p 03 _ 01 .asp?expno= 632.