political moderate. In 1997 , when the SLORC renamed itself the State Planning
and Development Council (SPDC), General Khin Nyunt was appointed to the
powerful post of first secretary.
In 2003 , Khin Nyunt became prime minister and announced a seven-point ‘Road-
map’ on 30 August 2003 that would lead to the formation of a constitutionally elected
government.^14 The seven-point Roadmap included ( 1 ) reconvening the National
Convention that had been adjourned since 1996 ;( 2 ) implementing the step-by-step
process necessary for the emergence of a democratic system; ( 3 ) drafting a new
constitution based on the principles agreed at the National Convention; ( 4 ) adopting
the draft constitution through a national referendum; ( 5 ) holding free and fair
elections for the Pyithu Hluttaws (legislative bodies) at various levels; ( 6 ) convening
of the Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members according to the new constitution;
and ( 7 ) building a modern, developed and democratic nation with state leaders
elected by the Hluttaw.
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s tenure lasted fourteen months before he was forced
to resign ‘for health reasons’. Concurrently, his entire intelligence corps – feared
and loathed by many – was dismissed.
15
Khin Nyunt was later placed under house
arrest, charged with corruption and sentenced to forty-four years in jail. His dra-
matic fall from grace highlighted the infighting within theTatmadaw. Khin Nyunt’s
wide-ranging intelligence corps was seen as a major threat to Than Shwe’s power
since Khin Nyunt had dossiers on all his fellow generals detailing their corrupt acts.
He was succeeded by Soe Win (a Than Shwe prote ́ge ́) as prime minister.
In keeping with the seven-point Roadmap, the National Convention was recon-
vened in May 2004 and adjourned in July that year. The National Convention
assembled intermittently, with meetings in 2005 , 2006 , 2007 and 2008. In February
2008 ,a 194 -page draft constitution was finalised. Throughout May that year, the
draft was placed before the Burmese public for endorsement. It was a highly
dubious exercise. As Donald Seekins noted:
The validity of the referendum was dubious: people were given ballots
already marked ‘yes’, officials voted for them (checking the ‘yes’ box),
and voters in some localities were required to write on their ballots their
ID card numbers. In many places...observers saw very few people
actually voting. According to local reports, the ‘yes’ vote was only 53 %of
the total in Yenangyaung Township in Magwe Division, 78 % in Meiktila
Township in Mandalay Division, and even lower in some parts of Shan
State. Yet, at the end of May, the SPDC announced that countrywide,
98. 12 % of qualified voters participated and the ‘yes’ vote was 92. 48 %.^16
(^14) See Robert H. Taylor, ‘Myanmar: roadmap to where?’ ( 2004 )Southeast Asian Studies 171 ; and
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, ‘Myanmar in 2003 : frustration and despair?’ ( 2004 ) 44 ( 1 )Asian Survey 90.
(^15) On the intrigue and struggles within the Burmese military, see Kyaw Yin Hlaing,
‘Myanmar in 2004 : why military rule continues’ ( 2005 )Southeast Asian Affairs 231.
(^16) Donald M. Seekins, ‘Myanmar in 2008 : hardship, compounded’ ( 2009 ) 49 ( 1 )Asian Survey
166 at 169.