v. concluding thoughts
Outwardly, the three countries considered in this chapter have little in common in
their constitutional development, despite their contiguous geographical connec-
tion in mainland Southeast Asia. Two of them are former colonies (one British, one
French) while the other stands apart as the only Southeast Asian state never to have
been colonised. That said, a number of similarities emerge from the recounting of
their constitutional journeys.
The most obvious of these is the predominance of the military’s role in all these states.
In a century where military regimes are viewed with circumspection or disapprobation,
democratically elected governments would much prefer it if the army confined itself to
the barracks and borders. However, there is no wishing the military away. If we cannot
ignore the military, especially when it has played a significant (not necessarily positive)
role in a country’s government, constitutional arrangements must take the army into
consideration. Not to do so would run the risk ofbeing hit by institutions exerting extra-
constitutional powers. Take the case of Thailand, for example: the military has tradition-
ally exerted a major influence in politics and government, yet the Constitution scarcely
factors it into its constitutional arrangements.
In Cambodia, the presence of the military is much less prominent but that is only
because the leading political party, the CPP, is the party commanding the greatest
military might. When the CPP lost the 1996 election, Hun Sen and his party were
reluctant to surrender the reins of power to Prince Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC. The
tensions that ensued led to the CPP’s 1997 coup that ousted Ranariddh from power.
So long as Hun Sen remains in power, the military will stay out of politics.
Of the three countries, Burma’s military dominates most obviously. Since 1962 ,it
has been the most important and significant institution of the state. Its pre-eminence
in government for so many years has also meant that outside the military, other
state institutions necessary for democratic government have not had an opportunity
to develop. It is all too easy to see Burma’s case as an aberration but, as I suggested
above, one cannot simply wish the military junta away. What the 2008 constitution
does is to secure for the military an entrenched role in the political life of Burma. In
many ways it is similar to thedwifungsi(dual function) of the Indonesian army
during the Soeharto era.
85
Indeed, several commentators have noted these similar-
ities.
(^86) What this means is that Burma will have to live with the military’s presence in
businessweek.com/news/ 2012 - 07 - 31 /thai-ruling-party-shelves-amnesty-bills-constitutional-
changes, accessed 6 Aug 2012.
(^85) See generally Nugroho Notosusanto,The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces
Especially since 1966 (Jakarta: Department for Defence and Security Centre for Armed
Forces History, 1970 ).
(^86) See e.g. ‘The Burmese road to ruin’,The Economist, 13 August. 2009 ; and Aung Naing Oo,
‘Clinging to Dwifungsi’ ( 2010 ) 18 ( 3 )The Irrawaddy,athttp://www 2 .irrawaddy.org/article.
php?art_id= 17931.