desuetude if a significant political opposition presence in parliament becomes
unexceptional.
Amendments to the presidency and financial provisions
The special entrenchment procedure in Article 5 ( 2 A) involves a referendum and
was developed in 1990 in conjunction with the elected presidency. This article has
yet to enter into force. The official reason is the desire to continue making insti-
tutional refinements in the light of experience, though it was originally thought that
this would be given effect after a few years.^60
The first decade saw two significant amendments to the presidency. The first
continued the trend of reducing the scope of the presidential veto which started
in 1994 ,
61
by exempting ‘defence spending’ from the veto and transfers of reserves
from statutory boards or government companies (SBGCs) to the government from
presidential scrutiny;
62
this provided that any transfers from an SBGC to the
government would not be taken into account in determining whether an SBGC’s
past reserves had been drawn down, provided the relevant minister made a written
undertaking to add the transferred reserves from the SBGC to the government’s
past reserves, which may not be spent. Originally, presidential assent was required
for any transaction drawing down on past reserves, an exception to the Article 21 ( 1 )
principle that the president acts in accordance with Cabinet advice. This same
‘transfer’ regime was, through 2002 amendments, extended to apply to transfers
between statutory bodies and the government, and between statutory bodies; in
2004 , the regime was extended to transfers between the government and SBGCs
and between statutory bodies and government companies, under Articles 22 B( 9 ),
22 D( 8 ) and 148 I respectively.^63 The requirement that the recipient entity place the
transferred reserves in their past reserves essentially means that the transferred
reserves will not be spent, as they do not form part of the current reserves.
Article 22 ( 10 ) provides that transferred reserves will be deemed to form part of
the past reserves of the transferee body – whether the government, government
(^6082) SPR 12 February 2007 (Art. 5 ( 2 A) of the Constitution (Operation of Constitutional
Provisions)).
(^61) Under Art. 151 A: the rationale was that the president had a role over social spending but
none over defence and security measures, which fell within the Cabinet’s responsibility: 63
SPR 25 August 2004 , cols. 417 ff.
(^62) A 1994 constitutional amendment introducing Arts. 22 B( 9 ) and 22 (D)( 8 ) allows transfer of
reserves from SBGCs to the government.
(^63) Art. 22 B was amended in 2004 to enable a Fifth Schedule statutory board to transfer any of
its past reserves to the reserves of the government or another Fifth Schedule statutory
board, without such transaction being regarded as a draw-down on past reserves. A 2004
amendment allowed similar transfers from the government to Fifth Schedule SBGCs and
between Fifth Schedule statutory boards and government companies, without such trans-
fer being regarded as a draw on reserves.