will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by
the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.”^116
This much was recognized by the Senate president, who presided over the
impeachment trial, when he admitted that the impeachment was the “rendition
of justice outside our traditional judicial system” and was “political in nature.”^117
This constitutional dilemma would arise typically in evidentiary issues wherein the
Senate/Impeach Court was called upon to subpoena supposedly privileged or
confidential evidence.
The biggest of these debates – indeed the issue which turned the tide against the
chief justice – was about the confidentiality of bank deposits under several statutes:
the Bank Secrecy Law^118 for all bank accounts; the Foreign Currency Deposits
Act^119 for dollar deposits in particular; and the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which
carves out an exception in case of money-laundering charges. The Senate, sitting as
an impeachment court, ordered the banks to disclose the bank deposits of the chief
justice. However, the court maintained the confidentiality of the foreign-currency
deposits, and the Senate voted to respect the court’s order.
120
When the prosecution tried to subpoena some court personnel, the Supreme
Court maintained confidentiality only for “internal deliberations...in the adju-
dicatory functions” of the court but opened non-adjudicatory matters to compul-
sory process. Significantly, the court invoked equality and comity between the two
branches of government, and the Senate itself rejected the prosecution’s attempt to
subpoena the justices themselves.
121
Indeed, the key evidence that spelt doom for the defense was the admission by Chief
Justice Corona himself, taking the witness stand and testifying voluntarily, despite his
right against self-incrimination, that he had not disclosed substantial amounts of dollar
deposits, claiming that the confidentiality of foreign-currency accounts shielded these
moneys from mandatory disclosure in his annual report of assets and liabilities.
In this light, both the Senate and the Supreme Court were careful not to tread on
each other’s powers, taking care not to provoke a constitutional crisis. However, it is
also clear that the rules were bent by the prosecution. No less than the trial’s
presiding officer, the Senate president (who voted to remove the chief justice),
lamented the evidentiary shortcuts aimed at shaping the public mind:
(^116) Ibid. (^117) Senate president Juan Ponce Enrile, Opening Statement (January 16 , 2012 ).
(^118) Rep. Act 1405 , Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act. (^119) Rep. Act 6426.
(^120) Philippine Savings Bankv.Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No 200238 (Order of Febru-
ary 9 , 2012 , preserving the confidentiality of foreign-currency deposits); andIn re Impeach-
ment Trial of Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Case No 002 - 2011 (notice dated
February 13 , 2012 , the Senate voting to respect the SC order).
(^121) In re Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials
and Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of February 10 , 2012 and the Various
Letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel Dated January 19 and 25 , 2012 , Resolution
(SC Resolution dated February 14 , 2012 ).