harmony. What can we learn from Nepal’s experience? Debates on constitutional
reform had preceded the armed conflict; it was their dissatisfaction with the 1990
constitution that led Maoists to their rebellion. Their agenda and that of the
Janaandolan raised fundamental questions about the restructuring of the state
and of society. A new constitution seemed indispensable if the agenda were to
be fulfilled. But one can still raise the question whether Nepal rushed too quickly
to constitution-making – and is now paying the price in the difficulties of agreeing
on a new dispensation.
It is not as if Nepali politicians and others were not aware of the difficulties of
moving from war to peace. I have mentioned that there was a general feeling that
a comprehensive peace accord was necessary before turning to the constitution,
and a CPA was indeed agreed, and was later incorporated in the IC. It is clear that
constitution-making cannot start unless some disputed issues have been resolved, or
the modality of doing so has been agreed. These include some of what we call the
technical aspects of peace making, as well as fundamental issues of ideology.
The former include the cessation of war, the disarming of militias, the disposal
of arms, integration of armies, and the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons.
Before the warring factions sit down to settle differences, it is important that they
should build trust between them (by, among other things, developing an agenda for
transitional justice), and agree on how the country is to be governed pending
permanent arrangements. It cannot be said that this was not attempted in Nepal.
Interventions by India and later the UN helped to bring the warring factions (in the
form of Maoists and seven ‘democratic’ political parties) together and, in a series of
meetings, agreements were negotiated which preceded serious consideration of the
agenda and process of constitution-making. In the peace-making and agenda-
setting processes, a question often arises: who are the appropriate and legitimate
parties to negotiations? Often it is the warring factions, who resist the inclusion of
civil society and other interests. One can see the dangers of overcrowding the
agenda and making agreement difficult by including too many parties. Equally
there may be a deficit of legitimacy if the negotiators are drawn from a narrow
section of society. It may be, as I argue below, that this has happened in Nepal,
especially given that the real trigger for change came not from these negotiators,
but from the popular revolution brought about by the people (mostly from margin-
alised communities). The aspirations of this revolution were not reflected in the
agreements that the parties made among themselves, and were not evident in
earlier versions of the IC. They were reflected in the CPA, but under pressure
from the marginalised communities. The delay in reaching agreement gave space
and time to the marginalised groups to promote awareness among their members of
their exploitation and oppression, and to sharpen their demands. It is as if two
unconnected dialogues were going on: one between the political parties on the
sharing of spoils, and the other among the oppressed.