power was uneasy with this agenda, and not only because it would chip away at its
privileges. Yet the factors and circumstances underlying this reform agenda are at
the heart of Nepal’s problems and will not go away. For stability and develop-
ment, the constitution-making process must deal with them. Nepal faces the
challenge of squaring the recognition of diversity with the benefits of the
‘nation-state’ (community cohesion, common values, willingness to sacrifice for
the common good, prospects of democracy, a common public space, the expres-
sion and development of culture).
In a word, the constitution-making process is about developing and recognising a
new identity which emphasises common bonds and interests while being respectful
of difference. The new identity cannot be imposed but has to be negotiated. This is
why the constitution-making process should have been a great deal more participa-
tory and transparent than has been the case so far. To a considerable extent the
political leadership of the elites nurtured during the former regime has been able to
resist challenges to the social order of that regime, while pretending to engage in
the search for a new order. They have effectively marginalised the CA but have
been unable to resolve differences among themselves – about power, fairness and
justice for all communities.
Why has Nepal had so much difficulty agreeing on a constitution? Maoists and
other political parties had substantial agreement on political and social reforms,
which the people supported, and the monarchy was disabled early. Was the
problem merely the obduracy of the old political leaders and the intransigence of
the new political players, the Maoists? Or was there a fundamental problem with
the sequencing of peace and constitutional processes after conflict? Should the
parties have waited until the all the peace issues were out of the way (disarmament,
truth and reconciliation, the phasing out of the Maoist army and the integration of
the national army, and firm agreement on the principles and procedures to make
the constitution)? In a way all these matters were discussed at length and were dealt
with in the IC and more conclusively in the CPA. At one level it seemed as if the
SPA and Maoists had reached enough consensus to move on to a more definitive
solution through a new constitution.
It is tempting to say that the real problem was the style of Nepali politics which
has bedevilled the country since it first adopted the parliamentary system – the style
of leadership and the constant intrigues to grab power, manifested in internal
struggles for party leadership and external undermining of other parties for
control of government. The re-entry of Maoists and the end of the monarchy
introduced fluidity in power and politics that opened the field for competitive
politics before the constitutional framework was agreed on. At every stage of the
process each of the major parties was competing to displace the others, despite an
early agreement on power sharing and working through consensus. The Janaando-
lan brought into being new social and political forces that the old style of exclusion-
ary politics could not deal with. Major progress by these new forces required the