extraordinary revolutions in the ease of travel and communications technology.
The almost instant availability of information about constitutional arrangements
elsewhere, coupled with the ability to seek speedy clarification, is thesine qua non
of the current phenomenon. Its impact is further enhanced by the creeping spread
of English as a common language for this purpose, as a growing number of states
make constitutional information available in English online.^6
It is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of the complex effects of
internationalisation on the constitutional arrangements of the states of the world,
but it is also necessary to move beyond generalisation. The remainder of this part
examines the principal paths along which internationalisation occurs and how
they contribute to convergence.
Vertical dimensions of internationalisation
The impact of international arrangements on domestic constitutional systems is
considerable and increasing. In their contribution to this volume, Yeh and Chang
argue for a condition of ‘transnational constitutionalism’ in which international
norms have ‘complemented – or even been substituted for – domestic constitutions’.
7
It is attributable largely to international human rights norms and their supporting
infrastructure, but other international institutions, including the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, also may
influence constitutional ideas and standards.
(^8) Most states are parties to the core
international human rights instruments, albeit with reservations, and thus formally
subscribe to the values that they represent.^9 To the extent that international
(^6) For example, the Constitutional Court of Korea:http://english.ccourt.go.kr/(viewed
5 March 2012 ); the Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China:www.judicial.gov.tw/en/
(viewed 5 March 2012 ); the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia:www.
mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=website_eng.Home(viewed 5 March 2012 );
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany:www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.
php?page=website_eng.Home(viewed 5 March 2012 ); the Constitutional Council of
France: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/homepage. 14 .html
(viewed 5 March 2012 ).
(^7) Jiunn-rong Yeh and Wen-Chen Chang, ‘A decade of changing constitutionalism in
Taiwan: transitional and transnational perspectives’,Chapter 7 of this volume.
(^8) For example, loans may be conditioned on measures to promote the rule of law: Ibrahim
F. Shihata,The World Bank in a Changing World(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991 ),
Vol. 1 , Chapter 2 ; Vol. 2 , Chapters 3 and 4.
(^9) International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, New
York, 7 March 1966 , in force 4 January 1969 , 660 UNTS 195 ( 175 parties); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966 ,in
force 3 January 1976 , 993 UNTS 3 ( 160 parties); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966 , in force 23 March 1976 , 999 UNTS 171 ( 167
parties); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
New York, 18 December 1979 , in force 3 September 1981 , 1249 UNTS 13 ( 187 parties);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or