There are many dualist states in which international treaties do not apply directly
in domestic law until transformed by domestic legislation. In these cases,
convergence does not depend solely on transformation, although transformation
is the most likely avenue for it. Even without transformation, international com-
mitments may influence government policy, systemically or through the suasion of
human rights advocates, including national human rights institutions applying the
Paris Principles.^16 International commitments may also affect the understanding of
domestic law through, for example, the interpretation of legislation or the consti-
tution and the development of other legal norms with encouragement, in the case
of Commonwealth states, from the Bangalore Principles.^17 The manner and extent
of the harmonisation of domestic with international law vary between states and
represent an intricate branch of public law.^18
Once incorporated into domestic law, by whatever means, international norms
necessarily rely on local institutions for application and interpretation. There is
potential for fragmentation at this point, but there are also forces of convergence at
work. International mechanisms to encourage domestic compliance include moni-
toring committees, UN rapporteurs and optional protocols establishing bodies to
handle individual complaints.
19
And while national courts have varying views about
the relevance of international law to the interpretation of domestic constitutional
norms, recourse to international legal sources is inevitable where domestic norms
are sourced in human rights treaties.
20
Supra-national or regional arrangements in Europe, Africa and the Americas
potentially penetrate the constitutional systems of their member states more
deeply.
(^21) The human rights standards they prescribe are interpreted and applied
(^16) Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles). See, for
example, Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Promoting democracy and finding the right direction: a
review of major constitutional developments in Indonesia’,Chapter 14 of this volume;
and Jongcheol Kim, ‘Upgrading constitutionalism: the ups and downs of constitutional
developments in South Korea since 2000 ’,Chapter 4 of this volume.
(^17) These resulted from a Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Norms in Bangalore, India, 24 – 6 February 1988 .( 1989 ) 1 African Journal of
International and Comparative Law/RADIC 345 ,[ 6 ]–[ 7 ]. The practice applies outside the
Commonwealth: in relation to Indonesia, for example, see Nadirsyah Hosen’s chapter in
this volume (Chapter 14 ).
(^18) For a detailed examination of the position in one country, Australia, see Cheryl Saunders,
The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011 ),
pp. 104 – 6.
(^19) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The core inter-
national human rights instruments and their monitoring bodies’,www 2 .ohchr.org/english/
law(viewed 6 March 2012 ).
(^20) And sometimes expressly mandated: Constitution of South Africa, sec. 39 ( 1 )(b).
(^21) For Europe, see Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the impact of the ECHR
on national legal systems’, in Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.),A Europe of
Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008 ), p. 677. For Africa, see Charles Manga Fombad, ‘Internationalisation of