of the SDF. However, according to the CLB’s interpretation of Article 9 ,itis
unconstitutional neither to maintain capabilities that fall short of war potential nor
to utilize these capabilities to defend the nation from direct invasion. Thus the
SDF is constitutional so long as it is maintained for the purpose of self-defense and
it limits force levels to those sufficient to provide “self-defense,” as defined
narrowly.
Third and most importantly, although Article 9 does not deny the right of self-
defense, it does not allow the exercise of collective self-defense recognized under
the UN Charter. In May 1981 , the CLB issued its “famously tortured interpret-
ation”^26 of collective security as follows:
It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of
collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an
armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations,
even when the state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore self-
evident that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective
self-defense under international law. The Japanese government never-
theless takes the view that exercise of the right of self-defense as author-
ized under Articleixof the Constitution is confined to the minimum
necessary level for the defense of the country. The government
believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds
that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution.^27
This opinion remains the politically controlling interpretation of Article 9 and has
imposed tremendous burdens on the government. For example, in 1992 when the
Diet enacted the Law Concerning Co-operation with UN Peacekeeping Oper-
ations and Other Operations permitting the SDF to participate in peacekeeping
operations, the CLB set strict limitations on the deployment of the SDF in
foreign countries in the form of five preconditions: ( 1 ) a ceasefire must be in
place and actively maintained among the host countries; ( 2 ) the host countries
must consent to the SDF participation; ( 3 ) the United Nations must be impartial
in the dispute; ( 4 ) the use of arms is limited to cases of self-defense or necessity
and may not be ordered by the United Nations; and ( 5 ) in the event of “suspen-
sion or termination” of any of the three preconditions, the SDF’s participation
ends.^28 In sum, the CLB strikes a very delicate balance between the limits
imposed by Article 9 and external pressure to contribute to the international
community.
(^26) Ibid.,p. 5.
(^27) The National Institute for Defense Studies (ed.),East Asia Strategic Review 2002 (Tokyo:
The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2002 ), p. 315 , available atwww.nids.go.jp/
english/publication/east-asian/pdf/ 2002 /east-asiane 2002 8 .pdf(last visited April 23 , 2013 ).
(^28) Edward J.L. Southgate, ‘From Japan to Afghanistan: the U.S.–Japan joint security rela-
tionship, the War on Terror, and the ignominious end of the pacifist state?” ( 2003 ) 151
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1599 at 1631.