14 TRUE STORIES, WELL TOLD.
ENCOUNTER Continued
14 TRUE STORIES, WELL TOLD.
scientific research], is entirely as
anthropogenic as the notion that the
universe was designed to make us
possible.” Is it your view, then, that
the belief—common among scien-
tists—that all things are potentially
knowable is itself actually a matter of
faith? And if so, is it equally reason-
able to view such mysteries as evi-
dence of the work of a higher power?
Or is it more that scientific methods
of inquiry are simply unequal to the
task of understanding such mysteries?ROBINSON: This confidence is a
perfectly good beginning place for
any inquiry. Its disappointments need
never be considered final. It is really
better thought of as a stance than
as a faith. In any case, the mysteries
science encounters arise from the
kinds of questions it can pose. Are
there multiple universes? Could we
ever know how many of them there
are, or how many might be inacces-
sible to us? Assuming that they are
significantly unlike our universe,
could we ever know any of them
comprehensively, or know that we
did or did not? I am not making a
theological argument when I say that
science will no doubt run up against
very real limits, though I would
expect much collateral insight to
come from its attempts. My point is
that it is remarkable to ascribe such
capacities to the mind, even as poten-
tial in it. We have learned in the last
few decades that we had overlooked
the greater part of the mass of the
universe. This is an instance in which
we discovered what we had not
known. There could be any numberof things we don’t know we don’t
know. Again, this is not a theological
argument. The model nonreligious
people have of religion as a way of
accounting for things science has not
gotten to yet is just nonsense. If the
purpose of the maxim about the ulti-
mate knowability of everything is to
preemptively seize contested ground
from religion, this is nonsensical for
the same reason.CNF: In “Proofs,” you also argue
that the received distinction between
science and religion reflects a failure
to understand religion—that religion
is not some brainless abdication of
critical faculties, but that, “[religion],
like science, addresses and celebrates
mystery—it explores and enacts
wonder and wondering.” Would
the pursuit of science be enhanced if
done with a greater openness to the
sources of religious insight? What
might this more enlightened version
of scientific exploration look like, in
a practical sense?ROBINSON: I think scientific
exploration as I described it above
is just great. It should do what it is
doing. This question seems to reflect
that entanglement of science with
“science.” I will mention the name
[Richard] Dawkins to make the point
that hostility to religion under the
banner of science is the whole object
of that exercise. Every criticism I
have made of their model of reality,
of human nature, motivation, and so
on, would still be just as valid if they
were somehow to add a tincture of
religion to it.CNF: In reading Gilead from a
science-and-religion perspective, it’s
hard not to get this sense that science
was deliberately banished from your
telling of John Ames’s life—that Gil-
ead is in part a thought experiment to
show that the principal (or highest?)
meaning that one can derive from
and in life must flow from the sorts of
moral and existential reflection that
religion allows and sustains—and
that science does not. Is religion a
more essential foundation for human
wisdom and psychological flourish-
ing than science? ROBINSON: Ames is writing in- Science then was a very differ-
ent thing. He would have known as
much about it as any intellectually
curious reader, but much he knew
would be superseded by now. I didn’t
want to involve myself in anachro-
nism, and I didn’t want him to appear
naive, when, by the standards of his
time, he would not have been.
CNF: Pursuing this idea a bit further,
in “Humanism,” you also offer a scald-
ing critique of neuroscience, which
you portray as founded on denial of
the one thing that we all know to be
true—that our individual, subjective
selves actually do exist. Your critique
would seem to suggest, then, that in
being based on an ideological fallacy,
neuroscience’s capacity for catalyzing
false beliefs is much greater than its
promise for yielding lasting insight.
Is that a fair reading of your position?
What are the implications of your cri-
tique of neuroscience for the scientific
ideal of freedom of inquiry?