101and despite the ongoing generational changes, it is the church which remains the
one of main carriers of Georgian identity. The situation is clearly in contrast with
the liberal, consumptionist western world. The divide is stressed by the Russian
and pro-Russian media and individuals who present the image of Europe rotting
and been taken over by homosexuals, deviants and Satanists. For example, the
Georgian audience may hear that rape in Europe is extremely common and often
occurs in broad daylight, that EU institutions ban the christening of babies and
equate the Orthodox Church with terrorist organisations. Such messages are found
on television, in the press and online as well as in slogans promoted by politicians,
especially those who are currently outside the parliament.
Reversing course?Georgian organisations and officials have highlighted how the Russian propa-
ganda machine is working to counter pro-West attitudes in Georgia. It has employed
Russian government-owned online media, such as Sputnik as well as other types
of information platforms, which are indirectly financed by Moscow. The network
of connections in the latter case is quite complicated.
Its core is the flow of financial resources through a
number of non-governmental organisations and private
interests to secure financing for pro-Russian media.
Such intermediaries include institutions such as Cau-
casian Cooperation, the Eurasia Institute and Eurasian
Choice. Their capital allows the operation of informa-
tion agencies such as Saqinform and Iverioni, the
Georgia & World newspaper and the online Patriot
TV. The pro-Russian narrative is aimed at building
Russia’s soft power in Georgia and eventually trigger-
ing a long-term change in the geopolitical orientation
of Georgians. The narrative may be falling on a fertile
ground, especially if the West appears weak and divided and if it does not present
a unified position on the possibility of Tbilisi’s further integration with the EU and
Euro-Atlantic structures.
At the same time, it is the fear of losing Georgia’s national identity that is the
main factor shifting Georgians away from the EU, next to the fear of cooling re-
lations with Russia. As a result, over the past number of years the proportion of
Georgians not supporting EU membership has doubled (currently it is at ten to
20 per cent). Moreover, the level of support for integration with the Moscow-led
The pro-Russian
narrative is aimed
at building Russia’s
soft power in
Georgia and
eventually triggering
a long-term change
of geopolitical
orientation.Visas for Georgians are not enough, Mateusz Kubiak Opinion & Analysis