New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

(Ben Green) #1

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nal ideas have been challenged, which is
very healthy. A Wary Embrace returns to
my original conclusions to see whether
they stand the test of time. And, on the
whole, I think they do.
While the China-Russia relationship
has developed better than many people
expected, its fundamental character has
not changed. It is still an essentially prag-
matic and unsentimental engagement.
Beijing and Moscow agree on certain
things like opposing liberal intervention-
ism. They both worry about an exces-
sively powerful United States. But their
priorities and interests can and do differ,
depending on the context.
Perhaps the main difference between
them is that China ultimately sees itself
as a power, if not on the same level as the
US, then certainly its only true global
partner and interlocutor. Russia, on the
other hand, has a tripolar vision of the
world, in which it is the great balancer
between China and the US, and between
East and West. To make good on this vi-
sion, it resorts to various bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms. Bilaterally, it
seeks constructive engagement with key
players, not just China, but also Japan,
India, Germany and France. It hopes to
rebuild relations with Europe and pre-
serve some level of manageable interac-
tion with the US. Multilaterally, Russia
promotes various international institu-
tions such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) and its
latest idea, a Greater Eurasia. Russia’s
aim is to use this mix of bilateralism and
multilateralism to establish a framework

within which it stands as an independent
and indispensable centre of global power.

In fact that view of being the balance
contradicts your theory on Russia unable
to cope in the new world disorder...
Moscow hopes for a seamless transi-
tion from the US-led liberal world or-
der to a multipolar order in which a few
great powers co-manage the world. But
the problem for Russia is that the liberal
order is falling apart and this new world
order has yet to emerge. The transition
between the old and the new will be long
and difficult. And this presents Russia
with significant challenges.

One interesting trend that emerged, par-
ticularly after the election of Donald Trump,
was the greater call for protectionism, even
anti-globalism, in the West, in a way mirror-
ing the Russian narrative on globalisation.
And this, in fact, is a point where China and
Russia diverge, as both see globalisation
very differently...
I have argued this consistently. China,
for all that it dislikes about US asser-
tiveness, nevertheless appreciates that
the US-led liberal order has provided
the ideal framework for its spectacular
growth over the last 40 years. China has
been transformed from a near-medieval
country, like a North Korea, to be the
world’s second power today. Indeed, it
has been the prime beneficiary of glo-
balisation – much more so than the
United States or any western country.
So China would like to retain the US-
led order, but with changes that reflect

Interviews Russia is unprepared for the next world order, Interviewer: Adam Reichardt
Free download pdf