64
of the Kirov region, Nikita Belyh, is in custody since the summer 2016 after being
accused of receiving a “large bribe” of 400,000 euros. This case is now character-
ised as an FSB provocation co-ordinated by the Kremlin.
The situation after 2014 is described by Russian state propaganda as “the new
normal”. Yet many groups inside Russia do not feel the same. The political elite do
not want to go against Putin, but at the same time they are nervous because of
the conflict with the West and the increased insecurity it is bringing about. That
is why a significant demand for change, in both domestic policy and international
relations, is not visible in the official agenda six months prior to the election.Stuck between past and futureThe independent Levada Center’s most recent poll (April 2017) found that nearly
half of Russians (48 per cent) would vote for Putin if the elections were held then.
Since people want to see a more positive approach towards domestic problems,
Putin has to formulate a new agenda before the election. The RBC agency reported
that the president may focus on trust, justice and respect as the main components
of his campaign. Though according to the business daily Vedomosti, Putin is strug-
gling to find an “image of the future” where he can run for the presidency.
The failure in seeking a future should not come as a surprise. During the last
several years, Putin has specifically focused on Russia’s past. He masterfully made
use of the fears and expectations of many Russians who are still traumatised as a
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The hybrid operations in Crimea and
eastern Ukraine were perceived by a large proportion of this audience as an at-
tempt to restore the Soviet Union. However, the subsequent developments have
shown that the Kremlin has neither the political will nor the resources to achieve
this aim. Moreover Putin can no longer provide stability, even for his core audience
(i.e., Russians aged 50 and older). The year 2018 will also be a challenging one for
the pension system. The government will not be able to tackle the problem of its
growing deficit as the federal budget will also run out of reserve fund resources.
This will lead to an inevitable increase of the retirement age, which is one of the
most unpopular issues among Putin’s voters hoping for state support.
The average amount of a monthly state pension in Russia is 200 US dollars.
According to forecasts the real level of a pensioner’s income in 2020 will be lower
than in 2014. The savings component of pensions has been frozen by a govern-
mental decision and according to Anton Siluanov, the finance minister, it was spent
to support Crimea. The problem of the collapsing pension system is highly sensi-
tive for Russian taxpayers and in a normal situation an open discussion would beOpinion & Analysis Putin and his monsters, Artem Filatov