New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

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to aid in the secession of Transcarpathia. At that time, there were also a series of

demonstrations pushing for this goal. In a pro-separatist demonstration staged

on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square in 2015, the extreme-right movement HVIM, with

strong links to Jobbik, expressed its gratitude to the leader of the self-proclaimed

Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, for releasing ethnic Hungar-

ian troops of the Ukrainian army in the eastern front. A Facebook post issued by

the same organisation in May 2014, titled “Patriotic Support for Russia”, explicitly

states that Transcarpathia (like Crimea) is not part of Ukraine, and adding that

Transylvania is not part of Romania either. Furthermore, the same organisation

called for a boycott of Roshen chocolates (the company that is owned by Ukrain-

ian President Petro Poroshenko).

Not only coincidence

Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, far-right and extremist organi-

sations – most of which had previously focused predominantly on ethnic, religious

and sexual minorities as their main enemies – redirected their attention to geo-

political issues. They not only agitate against N ATO and the European Union, but

also share a particular sympathy towards Vladimir Pu-

tin’s Russia, which they regard as an ideological and

political model. At the same time, they have expressed

a deep hatred of Ukraine’s leadership following the

Revolution of Dignity. While authoritarian, ultracon-

servative, anti-western, anti-American far-right move-

ments in Central and Eastern Europe find reason to

feel some ideological sympathy towards Russia and its

leader, it sometimes leads to the abandonment of their

anti-communist roots.

In addition, there is much more political alignment

between the actors than shared values alone. Parallel

political goals and actions are easily identified with

open sources and documented ties. A recent research project focusing on five

countries in Central Eastern Europe conducted by Political Capital (a Budapest-

based research institute) illustrates how these links are not only accidental and

coincidental. They are based on numerous ideological and personal co-operations

between Russian businessmen, politicians, diplomats and local organisations. These

ties perfectly fit into the broader efforts by the Kremlin to undermine the region’s

stability in general, and bilateral links with Ukraine in particular, by supporting

Far-right movements

in Central and

Eastern Europe that

find ideological

sympathy towards

Russia and Putin

end up abandoning

their anti-

communist roots.

Opinion & Analysis Central Europe is more vulnerable than it appears, Péter Krekó, Edit Zgut and Lóránt Győri