81consistently built up political and intelligence capacities since 2000 in pursuing
Russia’s interests across the region. While the full force and complexity of Russian
military and disinformation caught Eastern European governments completely off
guard in 2014, the national security exposure to paramilitary ultra-nationalist or-
ganisations still lacks an adequate official response. Poland and the Czech Republic,
at the moment, are investing resources into military and disinformation resilience.
Hungary, however, (and its western neighbour Austria, for example) is weak in
reacting to or acknowledging Russian disinformation and destabilisation efforts.
Countering foreign influence on paramilitary organisations and radical groups is
made even more difficult by the increasingly pro-Russian policies of the Orbán
government and the lack of motivation to defend its
national security interests. The government’s rhetoric
also features ideological elements and conspiracy the-
ories originating in Russian propaganda that attempt
to weaken western liberal values. Slovakia is taking
some steps (such as employing 12 new experts to coun-
ter Russian disinformation) but with an ambivalent
commitment. Only the Czech Republic has raised the
issue of hybrid threats from Russia; they can be found
in publically available state security documents and
strategic reports. The Slovakian government has prom-
ised to include something similar in the future.
Generally, the response of Central European countries to the threat of malicious
Russian influence has been reluctant, half-hearted and really only emerging from
lower levels. Most of this is due to the fact that some leading politicians, such as
Viktor Orbán, Robert Fico and Miloš Zeman, do not want to dampen their busi-
ness and political relations with Russia. Nationalist politicians, otherwise posing
as defenders of their nations, tend to remain silent when it comes to obvious inci-
dents, even violent ones, of Russia trying to undermine national sovereignty. Their
diplomatic silence and “pragmatic” economic and political ties to Russia encour-
age them further. Law enforcement agencies and secret services are still infiltrat-
ed by Russian secret services which make it more difficult for countering threats.
This situation emphasises why Central Europe’s vulnerability and susceptibili-
ty should remain a serious concern for the EU and N ATO. Instead, the main de-
bate within N ATO focuses on what country is paying its “fair share”. While this is
an important issue, it is relatively short-sighted. The main question, when it comes
to the post-socialist states, is not their commitment to N ATO but their resistance
to aggressive Russian influence. The fact that some influential players and even
law enforcement institutions remain passive towards the Kremlin and its extrem-
Hungary has
proven to be weak
in reacting to or
acknowledging
Russian
disinformation
and destabilisation
efforts.Central Europe is more vulnerable than it appears, Péter Krekó, Edit Zgut and Lóránt Győri Opinion & Analysis