The EconomistJanuary 27th 2018 3
THE FUTURE OF WAR
SPECIAL REPORT
A list of sources is at
Economist.com/specialreports
CONTENTS
5 Great-power conflict
Pride and prejudice
7 Information war
My truth against yours
8 Hybrid warfare
Shades of grey
9 Cities
House to house
10 Power projection
Stay well back
12 Threats to nuclear stability
Not so MAD
13 Military robotics
War at hyperspeed
15 Autonomous weapons
Man and machine
1
IN THE PAST, predictions about future warfare have often put too much
emphasison new technologies and doctrines. In the 19th century the
speedy victory ofthe Prussian army over France in 1870 convinced Euro-
pean general staffs that rapid mobilisation by rail, quick-firing artillery
and a focus on attack would make wars short and decisive. Those ideas
were put to the test at the beginning of the first world war. The four years
of trench warfare on the western front proved them wrong.
In the 1930s it was widely believed that aerial bombardment of cit-
ies would prove devastating enough to prompt almostimmediate capitu-
lation. That forecast came true only with the invention of nuclear weap-
ons a decade later. When America demonstrated in the first Gulf war in
1990-91 what a combination of its precision-guided munitions, new intel-
ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods, space-based commu-
nications and stealth technology could achieve, many people assumed
that in future the West would always be able to rely on swift, painless vic-
tories. But after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11th 2001,
wars took a different course.
This special report will therefore offer its predictions with humility.
It will also limit them to the next 20 years or so, because beyond that the
uncertainties become overwhelming. And it will not speculate about the
clear and present danger of war breaking out over North Korea’s nuclear
weapons, which with luck can be contained. Instead, it will outline the
long-term trends in warfare that can be identified with some confidence.
In the past half-century wars between states have become exceed-
ingly rare, and those between great powers and their allies almost non-
existent, mainly because ofthe mutually destructive power of nuclear
weapons, international legal constraints and the declining appetite for
violence of relatively prosperous societies. On the other hand, intrastate
or civil wars have been relatively numerous, especially in fragile or fail-
ing states, and have usually proved long-lasting. Climate change, popula-
tion growth and sectarian or ethnic extremism are likely to ensure that
such wars will continue.
The new battlegrounds
War is still a contest of wills, but technology and geopolitical
competition are changing its character, argues Matthew Symonds
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
As well as those mentioned in the
text, the author would like to
express special thanks to the
following people for their help in
preparing this special report:
Douglas Barrie, Susanna Blume,
Justin Bronk, Gen Sir Nicholas
Carter, Malcolm Chalmers, Emil Dall,
Robert Einhorn, Sir Lawrence
Freedman, Andrew Glazzard, Mark
Gunzinger, Kathleen Hicks, Karin von
Hippel, Andrew Krepinevich, James
Lewis, Lt Col Debi Lomax, Thomas
Mahnken, Raj Shah, James Sullivan,
Trevor Taylor and Andrew Tyler.
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