VATICAN II AND THE COLD WAR 33Florida, from which it could easily attack the Cuban bases.12 Ten-
sions were brewing. Two days earlier, President John F. Kennedy
had been shown evidence that the Soviet Union had installed of-
fensive missiles in Cuba that could easily reach cities in the Unit-
ed States and Latin America. However, he delayed revealing the
presence of missiles in Cuba until he had more concrete evidence.
On October 22, he addressed the people of the United States
on television, showing aerial photographs of the missile sites. He
then announced the beginning of a naval blockade of all ship-
ping to Cuba.13 Life, the popular American weekly pictorial jour-
nal, had been ready to run its cover story on the Council, with
a photographic display of the pageantry taking place inside the
Vatican. Instead, its cover carried a picture of an American ship
bearing down on a Soviet freighter, with the accompanying story
inside coming immediately after the pictures of the opening of
the Council.14 The juxtaposition of the conflicting images cap-
tured the emotions of the day.
The Soviet Union’s real objective was not to threaten an attack
from Cuba on the United States, but to force an Allied withdrawal
from Berlin. Missiles in Cuba were a ploy to test the mettle of the
young American president on the eve of American congressional
elections. Khrushchev also had to prove to his domestic oppo-
nents that he was strong in confronting the West.15
As Kennedy and Khrushchev began their diplomatic jockey-
ing, a group of Soviet and American academics and journalists
was assembling at Phillips Exeter Academy in Andover, Massa-
- New York Times, October 19, 1962.
- Ibid., October 23, 1962. The text of this address and other key U.S. docu-
ments in the Cuban Missile Crisis are given in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh,
eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Reader (New York:
New Press, 1992), 150–54. - Life, November 2, 1962. The story of the blockade begins on page 34.
- For a summary of Kremlin motivations, see Michel Tatu, Power in the Krem-
lin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 230–97.