The Economist May 21st 2022 China 41
W
arhasmadetheKremlintryhard
ertoenvelopRussiansina parallel
informationuniverse,inwhichUkraine
isrunbyNazisandRussiansoldiersare
liberators(seeInternationalsection).
China’sgovernmentisdoingsomething
similar.Whereasitspropagandafor
foreignearsstressesChina’sdesirefor
globalharmony,athomeit notonly
allowsbutevenencouragestheexpres
sionofcausticallynationalistviews
online,especiallyontopicssuchasHong
Kong,Taiwan,covid19andUkraine.
A groupofanonymousactivistsis
nowtryingtoexposethisparalleluni
versetothewiderworld.InMarchthey
launcheda Twitteraccountthattrans
latesforforeignaudiencesextremist
commentarythatChina’scensorsallow
onsocialmediaplatforms.TheGreat
TranslationMovement(tgtm) provides
thenonChinesespeakingworldwitha
rareglimpseofhowtheCommunist
Partydistortsonlinediscourseamongits
citizensathomeandabroad,where
manygettheirnewsfromChinesesocial
media(TwitteritselfisblockedinChina).
Ittypicallypostsscreenshotsand
EnglishtranslationsofChineserespons
estostatemediareportsregarding,for
instance,Russia’sbombingofa Ukrai
nianschoolonMay7ththatkilled 60
people.Mostdismissedit asa setup.
“BrotherPutinwillneverdosucha
thing,”readone.Anotherrecentpost
concernednatosupportforUkraine.
Severalcommentsurgednuclearstrikes
onAmericaoritsallies.China’sgovern
mentprofessesneutralityoverUkraine,
butclearlyfavourstheinvaders.
InaninterviewviaTwitter,account
administratorssaidtheidentityofmany
contributorsisunknown,butmanyare
Chinesebornstudentsorprofessionals.
Italreadyhas155,000followersand
hundredsofcontributorstranslating
postsintomanylanguages.
Ithasalsotoucheda nerveinBeijing.
Chinesestatemediaandacademicshave
condemnedtgtmwithunusualvigour,
brandingit partofa Westernledin
formationwarfarecampaign.Wang
QiangoftheNationalDefenceUniversity
warnedthatit aimedtostira popular
uprisinginChina.Heaccusesit ofcher
rypickingcommentsandignoring
extremistviewsonlineintheWest.
tgtmdeniesanylinktoforeigngov
ernments.Itsaysit choosescomments
thatarewidelylikedorwrittenbyopin
ionleaderswithlargefollowings.What
makesChinadifferentisthatWestern
governmentspermitmultipleviews.The
partypromotesa singlenarrativeon
manyissuesandencouragesextremist
commentswhichamplifythat,while
censoringalternativeopinions.Whatis
allowedtoremainiswhatinfluences
millionsinsidetheGreatFirewall,says
oneadministrator.“Theseviewsget
perpetuatedwithintheechochamber.”
tgtmhasitsWesterncritics,who
questionitsbleakportrayalofChinese
society.Itsimpact,though,isclear.
“TheydisruptedtheChinesegovern
ment’scommunicationmachine,”says
XiaoQiangoftheUniversityofCalifor
nia,Berkeley.“That’swhyit’ssoupset.”
Onlinecensorship
Found in translation
AnewTwitteraccounthighlightspartysupportforultra-nationalism
Pandemicmeasures
All eyes on Beijing
O
nmay17ththeauthoritiesinShanghai
announced that a milestone had been
reached in the city’s draconian lockdown
that has lasted nearly two months: no new
cases for three days outside quarantine ar
eas. But officials say people across China
must not let their guard down. Despite
growing signs of discontent and severe
damage to the economy (see Finance sec
tion), the country’s health chief, Ma Xiao
wei, said on May 16th: “We’re a long way off
being able to relax.”
On social media, complaints swirl
about the heavyhandedness of Shanghai’s
lockdown, which involves mass testing
and containing all new outbreaks within
quarantine sites. Though painful, it is
crudely effective. During the Omicron out
break, Shanghai has recorded fewer than
600 deaths, roughly one per thousand in
fections.A recent paper in Nature Medicine,
a journal, concluded that, if restrictions
had not been applied, the Omicron out
break could have led to 1.6m deaths nation
wide within six months. As it and others
note, this is largely because China has
failed to vaccinate enough elderly people.
All eyes are now on the capital. Cases
there are still far lower than in Shanghai,
which itself is recording just hundreds a
day. But other cities have adopted more
sweeping controls than Beijing with even
fewer cases. It prefers to focus on buildings
where cases have been found and districts
with higher numbers of infections. Such
areas face the closure of schools and shop
ping malls, workfromhome orders, the
suspension of some public transport and
frequent mass testing.
Officials are grappling with tough polit
ical decisions in the battle with covid (see
Chaguan). This is particularly true in Bei
jing. It wants to avoid any disruption to the
crucial Communist Party congress later
this year at which China’s president, Xi Jin
ping, is expected to secure another five
year term as party leader. A large covid out
break would cast a dark shadow, but so
would public anger over a hard lockdown.
Shanghai officials say they will start
loosening restrictions from June 1st and
that life in the city could be back to normal
by the end of June. But other moves suggest
the “zerocovid” policy could remain in
place well beyond the congress. On May
14th China said it would no longer host the
2023 Asian Cup football competition, due
to be held in June and July of next year.
The party’s determination to crush co
vid has elicited criticism abroad. “When
we talk about the zerocovid strategy, we
don’t think that it is sustainable,” said Te
dros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the World
Health Organisation’s boss, on May 10th,
prompting a sharp rebuke from China.
On May 15th a rare offline show of dis
content will have rung alarm bells at party
headquarters: a group of students at Peking
University gathered to complain about co
vidrelated restrictions. Authorities have
been sensitive to any hint of student activ
ism on that campus since the 1980s, when
it was a hotbed of antigovernment unrest.
Online, censors have been trying to stifle
grumbles about the government’s mea
sures, for example by deleting videosofthe
angry students and posts quotingDrTe
dros. It is proving an uphill battle.n
The capital tries to avoid a lockdown