Preface xvand proceduresthatthe Statemustimplement.A republicconsidersthoseprinciplesand
proceduresto be so importantthatthe republicstipulatesthatcitizenseithercannotvote
downsuchprocedures,or cannotsimplyamendthoseproceduresthrougha majority
vote,insteadrequiringa supermajority.Consistentwiththe principlesof liberalism,a
liberalrepublicprioritizesthe individual’s autonomyoverany attemptby the majorityto
spoliatethe individualfor someostensivecollectivebenefit.Werethe policeor prosecu-
torsof a governmentto be ableto prosecutepeoplewithimpunity,thereis a great
likelihoodthattheycouldfalselyaccuseinnocentpeopleof crimesandtheninflictvio-
lenceuponthemas punishment.Sucha government,then,wouldbe spoliatinginnocent
people.It is to guardagainstsuchviolationsthata liberalrepublicinstitutesthe ruleof
law and DueProcess.As I arguedin BookOne,though,a regulatory-entitlementstatecan
maintaindueprocesswhilecontinuingto spoliatepeoplewrongfully.Imagine,for in-
stance,that a governmentinstituteda law forbiddinganyonefromkeepinga felinein her
home.Angelapeaceablykeepsa cat in her house,harmingno one else.Thatgovernment
couldgo throughthe necessarydue-processproceduresto prove,beyondany shadowof
a doubt,thatAngelaindeedcommittedthe infractionfor whichthe authoritieshad
chargedher. If Angelareceivesthe necessarydue process,the governmentwill still spoli-
ate her by punishingher for her peaceableaction.Therefore,a regulatory-entitlement
statecan maintainrepublicanDueProcessin the absenceof the purefreedomof a night
watchmanstate.Despitethatfact,DueProcessis necessaryto guardagainstviolent
punishmentof the innocentandfalselyaccused,andthereforethe freedomof the night
watchmanstatecannotpersist,in the longrun,in the absenceof DueProcess.
ThroughoutpartII of BookOne,I explainedthe principlesgoverninga nightwatch-
manstateandhow,accordingto the standardsof rationalethics,any systemof govern-
mentotherthanthe nightwatchmanstateprovesa moralfailure.I wentas far as explain-
ing that,in the longrun,a perfectlyfree societywouldfinanceits nightwatchmanstate’s
police,military,andcourtsthroughconsensualcontractsandnot throughcompulsory
taxation.I alsowentintodetailto refutethe notion,popularizedby ThomasHobbesand
Jean-JacquesRousseau,whichstatesthat,simplyby takingpartin a community,a person
tacitlyconsentsto someSocialContractthat justifiescompulsorytaxationand everyother
Stateencroachmentuponthe individual’s peacefulautonomy.
BookTwoof Three
BookTwoof the trilogy—Life in the MarketEcosystem(LIME)—is dividedintothree
parts,andin it I explainwhatevolutionarytheoryhas to say on this issue.Despitesuch
evolutionarypsychologistsas EdwardO. WilsonandCharlesLumsdenopposingthe
nightwatchmanstate,I contendthatwhenonetakesWilson’s andLumsden’s well-
arguedtheoryof gene-cultureco-evolutionto its finalconclusion,onefindsthatfree
enterpriseis the socialsystemmostconducivefor everyindividual’s prosperityand
therefore,by the standardsof rationalethics,the morallysupremesocialsystem.PartI
explainsthe basicsof howevolutionarytheoryapplies.Theevolutionarypsychologists’
gene-cultureco-evolutiontheoryrecognizesthatwhetheror not a personpracticesa
specificcustomis not geneticallypredetermined;it is not as if a person’s genescausehim
or her to observethat custom.Likewise,shouldsomeonepracticea specificcustom,his or
her skillin doingso is not necessarilygeneticallypredetermined.Rather,whensomeone
practicesa custom,it is on accountof thatpersontakingthe initiativeto inventit him-or
herself—an act of freewill—or of havingadoptedthatcustomuponlearningit from
others.In any case,continuethe evolutionarypsychologists,althoughno customis genet-
icallyinborn,it doeshappenthatwhetheror not a personpracticesa specificcustomcan
helpinfluencethe likelihoodof thatpersonsurvivinglongenoughto havechildrenand