292 Chapter 11
wouldstill receivecharityin his idealsort of politicalsystem.He saidthatrich menwho
engagedin no philanthropywouldbe subjectedto much-deservedsocialostracism.There
“meetsus the objectionthatthereif thereis no compulsoryraisingof fundsto relieve
distress,and everythingis left to the promptingsof sympathy,peoplewhohavelittleor
no sympathy,forminga largepartof the community,willcontributenothing... It is
forgottenthatin the absenceof a coercivelawthereoftenexists...publicopinion....
Henceit mayreasonablybe concludedthat if privatevoluntaryreliefof the poorreplaced
publiccompulsoryrelief,the diffusedsentimentwhichenforcesthe one wouldgo a long
waytowardmaintainingthe other.The generalfeelingwouldbecomesuchthat few,even
of the unsympathetic,woulddareto facethe scornwhichwouldresultdid theyshirkall
shareof the commonresponsibility;andwhiletherewouldprobablybe thusinsured
somethinglike contributionsfromthe indifferentor the callous,therewould,in someof
them,be initiated,by the formalpracticeof beneficence,a feelingwhichin courseof time
wouldrenderthe beneficencegenuineand pleasurable.”^126
By this logica manwoulddeserveto be hatedif he choseto becomea hermit(possibly
livingin a partof wildernessnot claimedas the privatepropertyof anyonebut himself)
violatingnobody’s rightswhileprovidingmaterialbenefitto no one otherthanhimself.
Spenceris explicitaboutthis.“Is eachpersonunderobligationto carryon socialinter-
course?Mayhe...leada solitarylife, or a life limitedto the familycircle?Or doespositive
beneficencedictatethe cultivatingof friendshipsandacquaintanceshipsto the extentof
givingand receivinghospitalities?... We mayindeedsay that,peremptory,” i.e., manda-
tory,“claimspermitting,someamountof socialintercourseis obligatory;since,without
it, generalhappinesswouldfall short.” Thatis reallyjust Spencer’s assumption.Thenhe
continues,“If a communityof solitaries,or familiesleadingreclusivelives,wouldbe
relativelydull—if gatheringsfor the interchangeof ideasandmutualexcitationof emo-
tionsadd,in considerablemeasure,to the gratificationsof eachand all; thenthereseems
to be imposedon eachthe dutyof furtheringsuchgatherings.Of course,this dutyis less
peremptorythanmostotherduties;andwhenit can be fulfilledmustbe fulfilledin
subordinationto them.”^127 Westerncivilizationwouldhaveto waitfor decadesbefore
someonesuchas Randfinallyspokethe truththatneitherSpencernor his free-market
alliesdaredto utter:that it is morallypermissiblefor a peacefulindividualto live primari-
ly—or exclusively—for his ownsakein a peaceablemanner.Spencerwill not countenance
yourrightto be a birdwhichfliessolo.Sadly,in his argumentsfor the nightwatchman
statein presentday (thatis, whatwas“presentday” for Spencer,not thoseof us reading
my book),Spencerlargelyfell backon collectivistprecepts.
SpencerjustlyapprehendedthatManchesterismproduceda sociopoliticalecosystem
thatwasfar moreconducivethanany otherin facilitatingthe proliferationof newtech-
nologies,products,and servicesthatimprovedcurrentlivingstandards,and wouldpro-
videthe foundationfor yet moreimprovementsfor the livesof thosein futuregenera-
tions.Additionally,as withAdamSmith,Spencerwiselyarticulatedthatsuchsocial
improvementswerethe resultof entrepreneurship,evenwhenthe sociallybeneficent
entrepreneurwasmoreconcernedabouthis ownwell-beingthanhe wasaboutthe side
benefitsthathis actionswouldinevitablyconferuponhis clientsandemployees.As
AdamSmithput it in hisTheoryof MoralSentiments, entrepreneurs“dividewiththe poor”
andtheiremployeesthe productiveresultsof “theirimprovements” in technologyand
services.Smithprovidedspecialmentionof howthishappenswhen,in “theirnatural
selfishness,” theseentrepreneursare interestedin nothingmorethan“the gratificationof
theirownvainand insatiabledesires.... Theyare led by an invisiblehandto makenearly
the samedistributionof the necessariesof life,whichwouldhavebeenmade,hadthe
earthbeendividedintoequalportionsamongall its inhabitantsand thuswithoutintend-