310 Chapter 12
anarchistscite the proliferationof ADRas proofof ADR’s inherentsuperiorityoverthe
courtsystem.In realitya largepartof companies’ currentpreferencefor ADRover
governmentcourtshas to do withthe currentgovernistsetupof the tort system.Werethe
tort systemto be furtherliberalizedby the incorporationofloserpays, muchof the compa-
nies’ preferencefor ADRovergovernmentcourtswouldshrink.It woulddriveup busi-
nesses’ usageof the nightwatchmanstate’s courtsandreducetheirdemandfor ADR.
Whenanarchistscite the popularityof ADRas evidenceof the supremacyof anarchy,
theyoverlookthat a largepartof ADR’s popularitywas stimulatedby the governismthey
wishwerenonexistent.
It can be arguedthat a single,powerful,pro-DPprivateagency—or an allianceof such
agencies—can pressurethe anti-DPagenciesinto becomingmore-DPoriented.Suchpres-
surewouldbe exertedthroughthe threatof violence.Evena threatof a mereeconomic
boycottwouldbe exercisedthroughviolenceif the pro-DPagencythreatenedviolent
punishment(contract-basedor otherwise)uponany clientof its ownthatdisobeyedthe
economicsanctionrules.But if sucha pro-DPagency—or an allianceof suchagencies—
exertedsuchpressureon otheragenciesto amendtheirpolicies,that pro-DPpartywould
be behavingin a mannercomparableto thatof a monopolistichegemony.If the pro-DP
partydid not exertpressureuponotheragenciesto allowdue processto non-consenting
minors,thenit wouldbe like a national-governmenthegemonythattoleratesthe oppres-
sionof minorsin otherjurisdictions,and that wouldmeananarchyhas not eliminatedthe
inequitableconditionsof the geopoliticalstatusquo.Contrariwise,if the pro-DPparty
doesexertpressureon otheragenciesto allowDueProcessto theirminors,thenit suc-
cumbsto actingas a regionalmonopolygovernment.
Someanarchistsproclaimthatan eight-year-oldboy shouldbe recognizedas contrac-
tuallycompetentenoughto decidefor himselfwhichprotectionagencyhe wants,regard-
less of whathis parentsexpect.It can be saidthatif a boy’s parentswanthimsubscribed
to AgencyG, whilethe boy wantsto be underAgencyH, thenthe boy shouldhavethe
rightto be underAgencyHagainsthis parents’ wishes.Theboy can get his wayeither
throughviolenceor nonviolentmarketforces,andneitheroptionappearsparticularly
convenientfor the anarchist’s case.Visualizea singleagency—or coalitionof agencies—
wantingeveryeight-year-oldboy to be recognizedas contractuallycompetentenoughto
choosehis ownprotectionagency.Supposethispositionis calledChildEmancipation
(CE).Shouldthe ChildEmancipatingagenciesbe unableto tolerateso manyotheragen-
cies forciblyholdingeight-year-oldboysas “clients,” the pro-CEpartycan threatenvio-
lenceto exertpressureon the protectionagenciesthatallegedlyopposeCE. Theywould
do so in orderto intimidatethe anti-CEagenciesinto conformingto the pro-CEstandards.
Again,thatturnsthe pro-CEpartyintoa kindof monopolistichegemony.Theother
alternativeis for all or mostof the privateagenciesto agreevoluntarilywithone another
thatan eight-year-oldboy shouldbe allowedto subscribeor unsubscribefromwhatever
agencyhe wants,regardlessof whetherit contradictshis parents’ wills.Yet suchindustry
standardizationconflictswithDavidFriedman’s pointabouttherebeinga lot of varietyin
havingvarioussocialsystemsfromwhichto choose.The morea marketanarchistregion
movestowardadoptinga mostlypeacefulequilibrium,the moreit will seemto be a move
towardregionalmonopolizationby one firmor a cartelof firms.By contrast,for various
firmsto competeby distinguishingthemselvesfromone anotherby settingup dissimilar
socialsystems,is to invitemorechaosand disequilibriumthatrendersinter-agencyskir-
mishesmorelikely.
To be certainthatdueprocessbecomesthe standardoperatingprocedureof every
entitythatadvertisesitselfas a defenseagency,a nightwatchmangovernmentmust
necessarilyhavethe finalwordon adjudication.Thisis whya societythatminimizes
spoliationmustnecessarilyhavea dominatingnightwatchmanorder.