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reputationis his privatebelonging,but thatlibelis a speciesof fraudthatdoesserious
damageto people’s lives—and a person’s life is his ownexclusiveproperty.Moreover,as
we shalllaterexamine,uncorrecteddefamationobliteratesthe contractualcompetency
that is a prerequisitefor contractlaw to functionproperly.
Of course,anarchistlibertariansproduceotherpoints.Theypropoundthatwhenthe
governmenttakesactionagainstslanderandlibel,the governmentbecomesa sortof
TruthPolice.Giventhe recordof governmentslyingto theircitizens,doesone wanta
governmentcourtto legislateoverwhatprivatecitizensconsidertruthfulor untruthful?
Uponfurtherreflection,I rejectthe anarchistlibertarians’ argument.First,I willaddress
the aforementionedargumentaboutTruthPolicing.It is anotherstrawman.In reality,
courtsrenderdecisionseveryday that requirethe courtsto decideunderthe law,official-
ly, whethera specificaccusationcan be substantiatedas truthfulor not.Whena court
deemsthatGustaveis guiltyof murderinghis wife,it publiclyand officiallydecidesthat
the accusation“Gustavemurderedhis wife” is true.Oncethe criminaljusticesystemhas
presenteddamningevidenceof Gustave’s guiltto the public,the legalsystemmustact
uponGustaveaccordinglyby imprisoninghim.
Obviously,courtjudgmentsare not alwaysthe sameas that whichlaterproveontolog-
icallytrue.Theontologicaltruthis thatwhichis truein fact.WereGustaveinnocentof
murderin factualreality,but convictedof thiscrimeby an unintelligentjury,thenhe
wouldbe guiltyin “legaltruth” but innocentin ontologicaltruth.Naturally,ontological
truthis moreimportant,andthe due-processsystemwasset up to ensurethat“legal
truth” comesas closeas humanlypossibleto matchingontologicaltruth.Contraryto
criticismsfromanarchistlibertarians,the abilityof courtsto err in theirdecisionsdoesnot
renderthe courtsystem,per se, to be morallyor practicablyillegitimate.Thatcourtscan
delivererroneousverdictsis whatgivesrise to the fact that the due processsystemgrants
defendantsandrespondentsthe abilityto appealrulingsmadeagainstthem,thereby
enablingthe judgesandjuriesof appealscourtsto double-checkpreviousdecisions
handeddownby otherjudgesand juries.^5
At any rate,any courtcasethat involvesanyoneaccusedof spoliation,happensto be a
casein whichthe courtmustofferan officialdeclarationof whatit judgesto be ontologi-
callytrue,and its decisionis “legallytrue.” A courtthatdispenseslegallytrueverdictsis
not the sameas a governmentalTruthPolicetryingto forceanyoneto believeanythingto
be trueor false.Anymemberof the publicis free to believethat a courtfalselyconcluded
an innocentmanto be guilty,or viceversa.By thatsametoken,the outcomeof a libelor
slandersuitdoesnot forceanyoneto believeanything.Hencethe thought-policeargu-
mentdoesnot stick.For that veryreason,whena court,uponobjectiveexaminationof the
evidence,rulesthatRoyis guiltyof libelingand slanderingWally,the court’s assessment
is a legaltruththat doesnot forceanyoneto agreewiththe courtruling,withRoy,or with
anyoneor anythingelse.
Libellaw avoidsbeingOrwellianthoughtcontrolon yet anothercount.An Orwellian
governmentthattriesto policethoughtis one thattriesto policepeople’s opinions—that
is, theiremotionalevaluationsof the facts,suchas “Wallyis muchruderandbrusquer
thanI wouldprefer.” Libellaw legislatesexclusivelyoverseriousaccusationsthat pertain
to empiricallydemonstrablefacts,suchas “It is verifiablytruethat Wallystolemy cat and
killedher.” Whena falseaccusationaboutmatterspertainingto factscirculatesthrough-
out the public,it can havea devastatingimpacton Wally’s abilityto live andact peace-
ablyby his ownjudgment.Sucha devastatingimpactis not comparableto peopleform-
ing negativeopinionsaboutWallybasedupontheirowninteractionswithhim.Further-
more,it is a straw-manargumentwhenanarchistlibertarianssay thatthe existenceof
libellaw providesplaintiffswiththe opportunityto sue peopleoverridiculouslyhyper-
bolicandunbelievablestatements,suchas “Wallyis the Devil,” or withaccusations