Jewish Philosophical Politics in Germany, 1789-1848

254 } Jewish Philosophical Politics in Germany

because spirit must struggle to raise itself up to the highest through its own

activity. Against this one could however object: if by nature, as well as by

world spirit, one understands not merely this or that stage of its totality but

rather this totality itself, then both are equivalent in their verity.... Indeed

spirit and nature are one and the same entity, which manifests itself now in

this, now in that form, yet “ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac orde et

connexio rerum.”^51

Hegel’s absolute reconciliation of spirit and nature is necessary only because

it misconstrues them in the conventionally dualistic and hierarchical terms to

which Spinoza, not Hegel, offers a true alternative. In this way Hegelian media-

tion presumes and perpetuates the divisions it purports to overcome.

For Hess, modern philosophy—including Hegel—engages in an egoistic

practice insofar as it strives to separate itself from, and assert itself over, nature

while also refusing to acknowledge its own limitations. Hess sees in the Spino-

zan concept of intellectual love an intellectually and practically superior orienta-

tion. A philosophy of intellectual love does not jealously guard or hubristically

overestimate its own limited sphere. Rather, even as philosophy, it understands

itself to be a part of and a participant in nature; it goes beyond itself, “offers up”

(aufopfern) its neat contours qua philosophy, and joyfully knows itself to be part

of the universe’s dynamic activity:

Hegel quite correctly defines fanaticism as the enthusiasm for an abstract

idea, which has no relationship to or consideration for existing conditions.

The opposite of this is the indifferentism, which, mired in relationships and

considerations, cannot engage in free acts [nicht zur freien That kommen

kann]. Between these aberrations stands genuine enthusiasm, which has as

much love as logic. Only intellectual love engenders something good and

useful in philosophy as in art, in spirit as in life. Yet philosophy has until now

remained without love and therefore sterile. If it had had love, it would not

have remained within itself [wäre sie nicht bei sich selber stehen geblieben] but

would have sacrificed itself and passed over into deed.^52

German philosophy, including Hegel, misunderstands its role and egoistically

shuts its eyes to its limitations. Intellectual love, for Hess, is joyful. Indeed, we

could say it is a form of epistemological and ontological “ecstasy”: a knowledge

of participation in being beyond oneself. The jealously guarded self poses an

obstacle to greater knowledge and activity. The most perfect understanding ex-

plodes egoistic limitation; this joyful epistemological traversing of one’s limited