antiair-warfare- and ASW-capable vessels than it would need for a surface escort
mission.
Assuming that two VLCCs per day would be needed to meet Chinese
oil demand, the logistics of implementing such a convoy system would over-
whelm the PLAN. Each group of two VLCCs would require round-trip steaming
time of thirty-three days from the Persian Gulf to China, plus a two-day turn-
around period to take on supplies and cargo. This thirty-five-day cycle, repeated
daily, would correspond to a need for at least seventy escorting surface war-
ships.^31 Logistics ships would be necessaryto refuel the escorts on both the
inbound and the outbound legs of the voyage (since the Chinese VLCCs would
be vulnerable to attack when transiting the Indian Ocean after off-loading in
China). Additional ships would likely be required to perform maintenance
and repair on the escorts. This is a rough calculation—if anything, it underesti-
mates the force requirements for the PLA Navy—but it does give a basic idea
of the assets required. In all likelihood, even if the navy acquired sufficient surface
combatants in the coming years to perform sustained convoy operations, China’s
leadership would still be forced to choose between escorting tankers and keeping
enough forces in the main theater of conflict to win the fight that triggered
the U.S. blockade. Indeed, a number of Chinese analysts write that it will
be some time before China can realistically defend distant energy supply
lanes.^32
The second strategy for protecting shipping is the offensive Mahanian strategy,
which entails taking the fight to the enemy, attacking his bases, and driving him
from the fight. The pattern of Chinese naval acquisitions in recent years suggests
that Beijing would incline toward such a tanker protection strategy. In essence,
China would employ its growing modern submarine force, new LACMs (land-
attack cruise missiles), long-range strike aircraft, and formidable ballistic-missile
force to attack enemy bases and punish any country that imposed a blockade or
lent its support to the blockading power. At present, China is simultaneously
building or purchasing four classes of attack submarine (Yuan, Song,Type 093,
andKilo). This construction program is unmatched in the contemporary world.
These submarines could conceivably launch the land-attack variant of the Rus-
sian Klub cruise missile, which boasts a range of 300 kilometers, as well as the
Dong Hai-10 LACM, which can strike targets 1,500 kilometers distant. Finally,
the PLA’s 2nd Artillery commands a force of more than 900 short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles.
Calling the Opponent’s Bluff
Unless the PLA can attain outright naval and air superiority in a given sea
zone, carrying oil in Chinese-flagged tankers during wartime might render the
PRCmorevulnerable to interdiction of its energy supply, because—at least in
An Oil Armada? 121