fleet does in fact make some strategic sense, at least from Beijing’s security-focused
perspective.
Security Implications
Not all security contingencies threatening Chinese energy security would
involve a Taiwan conflict. A terroristattack on a Saudi export terminal that
suddenly tightened world oil markets, for example, might be sufficient to trigger
a government ‘‘call’’ on state-run tankers. It might prove difficult for Beijing to
press PRC-flagged tankers into state service during a crisis, however. Assuming
PRC tanker operators follow normal peacetime operating principles, their
VLCCs could be chartered out to shippers in places as far afield as Nigeria,
Venezuela, or northwest Europe. Given the distances involved, it might take
thirty days or more for these vessels to reach Chinese ports, even if they immedi-
ately diverted from their charters and headed for China.
If it had some advance warning, the Chinese central government might notify
tanker operators ahead of time and preposition them for crisis oil deliveries.
However, numerous commercial observers carefully track tanker movements,
meaning that even covert preparations on the part of the PRC would likely be
noticed quickly. Other major powers would rapidly become aware that China
was marshalling assets, and might see such an action as a sign that Beijing antici-
pated hostilities. Consequently, rather than helping ensure national security, Beij-
ing’s decision to call on PRC-flagged tankers during times of major tension could
well cause other actors to assume the worst—thereby precipitating a more serious
crisis.
An Oil Armada? 123Figure 6.4 PRC Tanker Flagging.
Source:Lloyd’s Ship Register.