of itself, however, a discussion of maritime issues rarely constitutes a complete
security or strategic dialogue.
In sum, maritime power generally, and certain types of maritime missions—
maritime security operations, power projection, and naval diplomacy—provide
significant, and in some cases unique, support among the various tools of
national power available to the Indian government. Publicly announced national
security objectives, however, are only so useful in an examination of Indian mari-
time strategy. Such objectives are, by their nature, political objectives. They
reflect the views of the current political party or parties in power. This means that
they are changeable with the group in power; in India’s case, they might take a
very different form under a government led by the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party).
In addition, the public nature of these objectives means that their edges have
probably been softened. Specific countries are not named. Seldom are specific
war scenarios or the need to hedge against close neighbors discussed openly.
Thinking about Maritime Power
To assess comprehensively how maritime power and strategy would best
support India’s evolving grand strategy, therefore, it is useful to examine Indian
strategic worldviews. This type of approach, drawing on categorizations by
scholars and other analysts, helps identify the range of views held within the
Indian body politic, suggesting how maritime power might serve different
governments. It also allows country names to be named and more detailed, more
controversial scenarios to be examined—something nongovernmental analysts
are more prone to do than government officials.
Two long-time analysts of Indian national security, Stephen P. Cohen and
C. Raja Mohan, have developed useful, but different, ways to depict Indian
worldviews related to national security. They provide two lenses through which
to examine how elements of Indian maritime strategy and power contribute to
Indian national security.
Mohan divides Indian grand strategy into three concentric geographic circles.^8
He posits grand strategic goals for each circle, stating Indian national security
objectives somewhat more neatly than does the official list discussed previously.
His innermost circle consists of India and its immediate neighborhood. Within
that geographic area, Mohan maintains that India’s twin goals are to seek primacy
and to veto detrimental actions undertaken by outside powers. Primacy in India’s
immediate neighborhood can probably be best defined as New Delhi’s ability to
impose its will and significantly influence the actions of others, including in the
military arena.^9 From a military perspective, primacy translates into the ability
to defeat the nation’s neighbors in wartime and to pursue diplomacy free of coer-
cion in peacetime. An aggressive form of primacy might see India use its military
might to compel neighbors to do its bidding. In the nautical realm, this means
India as a Maritime Power? 129