first quarter of the 21st century must look at the arc from the Persian Gulf to the
Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest.’’^33
This statement is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it acknowledges that
India’s maritime vision has limits, at least for the short term. (See the discussion
of Operation Sukoon, below.) Second, it states a time limit beyond which—
presumably—India’s legitimate regions of interest may expand. With respect to
economic and energy security, India’s gaze will indeed remain on the Indian
Ocean region for the next decade-plus, ending at the Persian Gulf (or perhaps
even the Bab-el-Mandeb) to the west and the Strait of Malacca to the east.
India’s Maritime Doctrine notes that maritime power relates more closely than
air or land power to the protection of economic interests. It points out that trade
is critical to the developing Indian economy, depicting the free flow of commerce
through regional SLOCs (sea lines of communication) as of paramount impor-
tance. It notes that India is in position to influence the movement and security
of shipping through the Indian Ocean SLOCs significantly, provided it has
sufficient sea power to do so.^34 This can be read as a statement of defensive
potential, a declaration that New Delhi can safeguard shipping bound to and
from India. It can also be read as a statement of offensive potential, putting
fellow regional powers on notice that New Delhi has the sea power to coerce
should it see fit. In fact, the doctrine notes that ‘‘control of these choke points
could be a useful bargaining chip in the international power game....’’^35
Construing the Maritime Doctrine as narrowly as possible, in both the geo-
graphic and the strategic senses, the IN must be able to protect the immediate
approachestoIndianseaports;achieveseadenialinIndia’sEEZ;and,ideally,
impose sea control as far away as the geographic chokepoints that allow entry
into the Indian Ocean. In other words, it must be able to defend Indian home
waters while ensuring the safety of merchant traffic in those waters. India’s
capability to perform these missions is sporadic at present, and it may even
decline over the next few years pending new acquisitions.
As noted above, the size of the Indian submarine force is shrinking temporarily
and will only rebound after the year 2010, when more of the refittedKilos rejoin
the fleet and the newly acquiredScorpenes enter service—the latter likely in the
2012–17 time frame.^36 While it is modernizing steadily, the IN surface fleet
needs more oceangoing vessels, along with additional patrol craft to monitor
and respond to contingencies in the EEZ. To remedy some of these shortfalls,
the navy’s Project 15A is producing three modern, follow-on destroyers around
which surface action groups can be organized to prosecute sea-control missions.
These units are slated to join the fleet beginning in 2008.
Vibrant naval aviation will enhance India’s ability to conduct sea-denial and
sea-control operations, not only in the national EEZ but also along the
approaches to the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere in
the Indian Ocean basin. To bolster its maritime domain awareness, New Delhi140 Asia Looks Seaward