406 millimeters) were forbidden for battleships. Cruiser and aircraft carrier main
batteries were limited to 8-inch (approximately 200 millimeters) guns. Aside
from battleships and carriers, furthermore, no other warships displacing more
than 10,000 tons were to be constructed.
This last restriction was particularlypainful for Britain, which placed great
value on large, long-range cruisers to patrol its far-flung dominions. Of more
concern to the United States was the agreement with Japan and the United
Kingdom that that ‘‘no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in
the [Pacific] territories and possessions [and] that no measures shall be taken to
increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval
forces.’’^15 In fact, Japan began violating this latter provision almost immediately,
as the American amphibious assaults against many Pacific islands were later to
prove, at a very high cost in U.S. and Japanese lives.
Finally, the Washington Conference of 1921–22 produced the Four-Power
Treaty. In this pact, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan agreed
to respect one another’s ‘‘insular possessions and insular dominions in the region
of the Pacific Ocean’’ for a period of ten years (ending in January 1931).^16
The Washington Conference thus concluded with a generally satisfied
United States, a reluctant United Kingdom, a resentful France and Italy, and a
dangerously split Japan. A sizable swath of public opinion in that nation accused
Tokyo’s representatives to the conference of sacrificing their honor and Japan’s
national security interests. This resentment contributed directly to the rise of
the hyper-nationalism that played such a significant role in Japan’s aggressive
behavior against China and the rest of Asia.^17
In the near term, despite popular Japanese reservations, the 1922 treaty made
Japan the dominant maritime power in Asia. In the longer term, however, the
United States’ already world-dominant industrial capability and economic
prowess more than made up for any force-structure deficiencies resulting from
Washington’s willingness to decommission existing warships and cancel new
shipbuilding projects. Indeed, this prowess allowed the United States to brush
aside the 1941 Pearl Harbor debacle as a mere six-month irritant.
The Washington Conference left many questions undecided, including how
submarines and other naval armaments should be allocated. These, along with
foreign rights and actions in Asia, remained a subject of diplomatic exchanges
and naval arms limitations talks throughout the remainder of the 1920s and
1930s, terminating only with the onset of World War II in September 1939.
Naval limitations conferences in 1927 (Geneva), 1930 (London), and 1934–
36 (London, again) highlighted the almost continuous series of diplomatic
exchanges and conferences that marked the interwar years. But these gatherings
failed to halt the slide into World WarII, which arrived in Asia in 1931 with
Japanese military expansion in Manchuria. The primary focus of these conferen-
ces shifted to Europe as Germany rearmed, but the United States never lost its54 Asia Looks Seaward