sea, Xu views China’s navy as a vehicle for asserting Chinese sovereignty abroad:
‘‘Naval vessels are symbols of state power and authority [which] can act as ‘mobile
territory’ and freely navigate the high seas of the world....[T]heir mission is not
limited to offshore defense.’’ For all these reasons, China’s navy must ‘‘unceasingly
move toward [the posture of] a ‘‘blue-water navy’’ [and] expand the scope of
maritime strategic defense....’’
By contrast, in an unusually explicit acknowledgment of the growing internal
debate concerning the purposes and priorities of China’s future military develop-
ment, Beijing University scholar Ye Zicheng maintains that ‘‘in the current stage
we must regard the building of China’s land homeland as the central task and
develop land power as the strategic focus, [while] the development of sea power
should be limited and should serve and be subordinate to the development of
land power.’’ For China, Ye explains, ‘‘possession of strong sea power is an inevi-
table choice...however...strong sea power must be and can only become a
component part of China’s land power.’’ China’s natural status as a land power,
Ye writes, means that its development ‘‘can only be based on internal land space,
and the development of sea space and expansion abroad can only be important
supplements.’’ China’s strategists must remember ‘‘the lesson of the late Qing:
When there are major problems in the building of a country’s system, it is impos-
sible to become a sea power just by developing maritime military forces.’’ Yet Ye’s
emphasis on land power ‘‘does not exclude the development of China’s sea
power, because China’s sea power is very far from meeting the needs of its land
power.’’^4 This assessment is supported by the 2005 edition of the PLA’s first
authoritative volume on strategy, edited by two major generals: ‘‘...because the
borders and coasts are far away from our central inland, some at a distance of
hundreds or even thousands of kilometers, it is very difficult for the projection
of forces, operations, logistics and supports.’’^5 Since Beijing is unlikely to issue
definitive policy statements concerning these important issues, its recent behavior
must be examined for clues as to its actual maritime trajectory.
At a Communist Party meeting held on December 27, 2006, Chinese
president Hu Jintao declared, ‘‘we should strive to build a powerful navy that
adapts to the needs of our military’s historical mission in this new century and
at this new stage’’ and is prepared ‘‘at any time’’ for military struggle.^6 ‘‘In the
process of protecting the nation’s authority and security and maintaining our
maritime rights,’’ Hu emphasized, ‘‘the navy’s role is very important.’’^7 Hu added
that China’s ‘‘navy force should be strengthened and modernized’’^8 and should
continue moving toward ‘‘blue-water’’ capabilities.^9
Hu’s words followed an incident on October 26, 2006, when a Chinese diesel
submarine reportedly surfaced within 8 kilometers of the U.S. Navy aircraft
carrierKitty Hawkas the carrier operated near Okinawa. The incident perhaps
suggested a new era of skill and confidence among Chinese submariners. Indeed,
Admiral William Fallon, then the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command,72 Asia Looks Seaward