China’s reconnaissance UAVs include Guizhou Aircraft Industry Corporation’s
new-generation WZ-9 (WZ-2000); BUAA’s (Beijing University of Aeronautics
& Astronautics) WZ-5 and WZ-5A variants (modeled on the U.S. AQM-34N
Firebee); BUAA’s VT-UAV vertical take-off/landing UAV; and the ASN-15,
-104, -105, and -206 tacticalreconnaissance UAVs. While visually similar to
General Atomics’s Predator, the turbojet-driven WZ-2000 (a prototype of which
is reportedly being tested) apparently has ‘‘far less endurance.’’^78 Guizhou is also
developing a medium-endurance UAV.^79 The ASN series, developed by Xi’an
Northwest Polytechnic University ASN Technology Group Company, includes
the short-range multi-role ASN-206, which is capable of conducting ISR opera-
tions, electronic-warfare operations, and electronic-countermeasures operations,
reportedly making it ‘‘one of the most popular and advanced tactical UAV systems
fielded by the PLA.’’ Chinese target drones include the TianJian-1 cruise-missile
simulation version (which reportedly entered service in 2005); Shaanxi’s Chang
Kong-1, -1A, -1B, -1C, and -1E versions (of the Soviet Lavochkin La-17C
radio-controlled subsonic target drone); and the Ba-2, -7, and -9 (ASN-2, -7,
and -9) radio planes. The Ba-9, developed by Xi’an, ‘‘was designed for the training
of navy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) crews on surface ships.’’
C4ISR
No overall assessment of China’s naval development is complete without
consideration of the increasingly important aerospace dimension. Any increase
in Chinese naval capability, from access denial to blue-water operations to power
projection, will hinge in part on aerospace innovations, from air- and space-
based platforms to C4ISR capabilities. By the end of the Cold War, despite major
imbalances in this area, China had become the first developing country to
achieve comprehensive aerospace capabilities. While China still confronts
some challenges, particularly in its aviation sector, it appears to be making rapid,
comprehensive progress in producing advanced aerospace platforms. This in turn
affords China an increasing range of military operational possibilities.
Beijing has the world’s premier sub-strategic mobile missile force. China
has positioned 710–90 mobile DF-11 (300 kilometer range) and DF-15 (600
kilometer range) SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) in coastal areas opposite
Taiwan, constituting an arsenal that ‘‘continues to expand at an average rate of
about 100 missiles per year.’’^80 Increasingly capable, accurate, and numerous,
PLA SRBMs offer decapitation strike and PGM capability that does not require
operationally more-complex manned aircraft. If sufficiently accurate and
employed in sufficient numbers, they can render Taiwan’s airfields inoperable.
SRBMs can also destroy infrastructure nodes, severely disrupting Taiwan’s ability
to transmit electricity, refine petroleum, and otherwise support its economy and
military.
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 85