The Development of the Philosophy of Species 289behave very distinctly in, say, time-lapse photography, as also would other vague
individuals like fungal mats, etc.).
Moreover, the distinction between species as a time-slice (synchronic) entity and
lineages as a time-extended (diachronic) entity also seems to me to fail as a sharp
distinction. All species are lineages, as de Querioz has it, but not all lineages are spe-
cies. A synchronic species is just a very foreshortened lineage in a slight time hori-
zon. It is never entirely “non-dimensional,” and so I do not see the need for a complex
and in my opinion unsupportable metaphysics of “potentials” or “propensities” such
as Mayr offered. Calling on the potential to interact in a given manner is begging the
question; this is only known ex post facto. In the end, a species must be seen logically
as an individual lineage, extended over time and space.
Clouds, Clades, and Grades: Natural Kinds or Natural Groups?
Throughout the natural kinds debate, philosophers have assumed that kinds of
organisms—in particular animals like tigers, zebras, and domestic animals—are
exemplars of natural kinds, or presented arguments why they are not, without stating
exactly what it is they are. Although species have been given a metaphysical treat-
ment as individuals, or particulars, in contradistinction to the “default” or Received
View that species are classes or universals, the nature of those individuals and of all
higher taxa they comprise has not been fully explored.
LaPorte has revived the claim, made also by others in recent years, that organisms
do form natural kinds.^25 In this, he focuses on the kinds—it is taken for granted they
are natural. LaPorte describes the sort of kinds organisms form as having a “histori-
cal essence,” one that is not based upon the microstructure of the organisms in each
kind being shared, but rather on a shared historical origin. Griffiths has also offered
a similar account.^26(^25) LaPorte 1997, 2000, 2004, 2018.
(^26) Griffiths 1999.
TABLE 13.1
Types of Individuals
Taxon Metaphysical Causal Phenomenal
A. Pure abstraction [Idea]
B. Phenomenal individual [Group]
C. Integrative individual [Effect]
D. Phenomenal, Integrative individual [Apparent Effect]
E. Historical individual [Particular]
F. Historical, Phenomenal individual [Apparent Particular]
G. Historical, Integrative individual [System]
H. Full individual