Species Realism 357
effects that make an organism the organism it is. Oyama’s comment indicates that
what “makes” a species includes, among other things, the extra-genetic heredity^60
within a metapopulation. In short, a biological life-form is neither going to involve
some uniquely shared set of properties nor will it be a social or cognitive construct^61 ;
it is part of a set of more or less stable processes that we observe and report.
Wittgenstein’s version of Lebensformen is that they have self-enclosed criteria for
typical behaviors and cognitive styles, which are self-constructed through the use
of language games.^62 It has no particular biological implications, and Sandler’s use
of the term is based upon species having self-justifying natural goods. Here, how-
ever, we can appeal to some more generalized features of the concept—that species
construct through their variable ways of making a living in their environment, the
properties that we see are clustered together.
Parenthetically, Lebensform is also a term that has a non-Wittgensteinian history
in biology, particularly in botany.^63 Eugenius Warming used it for the forms of veg-
etation.^64 Raunkiær, a Danish ecologist, proposed what has come to be known as the
Life-form Spectrum, which was early adopted as a taxonomy of ecotypes.^65 It is still
in use today. Helmreich and Roosth argue that the term has always held the implica-
tion of “a space of possibility in which life might take shape,” and so it is appropriate
to employ it in this context.^66
Recognition of a Lebensform is still something that is done iteratively and recur-
sively. And in line with the notion of a family resemblance predicate, it is not to be
expected that there will be sharp or universal tests for delimiting species.
Consequences
Taking species as phenomena makes sense of several facts about biological science.
It explains why we recognized species well in advance of there being anything
remotely like a theoretical explanation of them, from the sixteenth century onward.
Ray’s formal definition in 1686 may have been novel, but his view was implicit in
the work of natural historians going back to Aristotle and Theophrastus. Genetic and
developmental accounts of species did not arise until around 1900.
It explains why when replacement terms are proposed for species, they tend to
settle on the same sorts of phenomena, and eventually species makes a comeback.(^60) The usual term in this case is “epigenetic.” However, as “epigenetic” is used in multiple ways, I would
prefer to restrict it to gene methylation and closely similar molecular inheritance, to avoid confusion.
(^61) That is, it will not be just a cognitive or social construct. Pretty well everything that is thought,
in science or society in general, is at least a cognitive and social construct; something else that
Wittgenstein noted in his later philosophy.
(^62) Lebensform is one of a number of similar concepts such as Worldview, Paradigm, Belief System, and
so forth, in which the criteria for justification, sense, or inclusion are determined by a comprehensive
set of beliefs that are incommensurate with other such sets. Wittgenstein’s comment about the lion
talking is meant to show the complete non-translatability of lion-talk and people-talk; but, as I have
argued, on biological grounds, lions and humans share a considerable homology and analogy of life-
styles and interests such that we can understand a fair bit about their signaling calls.
(^63) Helmreich and Roosth 2010.
(^64) Warming 1895.
(^65) Smith 1913, Raunkiær 1934.
(^66) Similar suggestions have also been made by Mulder 2016 and Hä h nel 2017.