LETTERS
flightglobal.com 17-23 February 2015 | Flight International | 49
SAFETY
Ill-informed comments on AF447
It has been interesting to observe the breadth of understandable
but sometimes ill-informed ongoing commentary regarding the
AF447 crash. Two under-appreciated problems have been touched-
on but must be addressed immediately.
Firstly, like it or not, an increasing majority of pilots come from
backgrounds where interaction with things mechanical was never part
of their upbringing. When operations are normal, it’s great, but even
when relatively small abnormalities occur, their training can be insuf-
ficient and the potential for difficulties escalates disproportionately.
This is exacerbated by outdated check routines in flight simulators
where failure scenarios are often known, rehearsed prior and thus
flown “well”. Regulators’ decades-old mindsets mean these failures
are tested and exact accuracy standards required. Constrained air-
line training departments thus administer “tick-the-box” programmes,
using simulators as instruments of pain rather than relaxed educa-
tional tools. Consequently, inherent “common sense” thought pro-
cesses become under-valued and this skill is thus either non-existent
or atrophied. Minimum accuracy levels must be achieved but simula-
tors should now be used as non-jeopardy training instruments to pre-
pare for the many and varied permutations of potential failures.
Secondly, aircraft manufacturers have much to answer for. After
the AF447 crash, Airbus issued difficult-to-understand Operational
Engineering Bulletins and Quick Reference Handbook amendments
that were band-aid fixes for bigger problems. These problems con-
tinue today. The A330 has a complex procedure for Unreliable
Speed Indication that almost guarantees nobody will complete it
accurately in the time required.
What is clear from AF447 – and potentially other recent incidents- is that confusion caused by pitot-static system icing/failure is a
fact. Airbus needs enhanced alternative systems and simpler proce-
dures to enable crews to retain/regain attitude control.
Having replicated AF447 type scenarios in simulators with crews
for whom English is not their first language, I can assure Chris
Skillern (Flight International, 13-19 January) that the apparent in-
competence he refers to is not as simple as he depicts and also
the final manifestation of a multifaceted problem.
Paul Lucas
Melbourne, Australia
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INTERNATIONAL
We welcome your letters on
any aspect of the aerospace
industry.
Please write to: The Editor,
Flight International, Quadrant
House, The Quadrant, Sutton,
Surrey SM2 5AS, UK.
Or email flight.international@
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must be no longer than 250 words.FLIGHT
INTERNATIONALThe need for
hands-on ability
In awe of F-35
Congratulations on Stephen
Trimble and Dan Parsons’ out-
standing article on the F-35 man-
ufacture (Flight International, 27
January-2 February). I am in awe
of Lockheed’s breadth of vision
and technical and management
capability. More!
I’m sure I’m not the only one
to be amazed that “structural
misalignment wider than a few
human hairs is enough to make
an aircraft shine like a light-
house in the electro-magnetic
spectrum”. I had no idea it was
that critical. And want to know
more detail about the EMAS as-
sembly concept.
I have long since given up on
the shallow technophobic jour-
nalism of the current round of
automotive magazines and, after
some years in the air force a
while back, re-discovering Flight
has been a tonic.
Tom Sheppard
Hitchin, UKStick to jokes
Re your Straight & Level piece
Not Mikoyan Well (Flight Inter-
national, 3-9 February) and the
line “...the world’s most danger-
ous mode of transport – a Mikoy-
an fighter...”, would you like to
explain the blatant propaganda
and back it up with some facts?
It’s ironic to publish that in-
flamatory story, in which no one
died, in the same edition as a
news article on how a US-made
F-16 killed 11 people and injured
many more. The Cold War fin-
ished long ago. We have enough
problems that politicians are stir-
ring up. We don’t need aviation
journalists adding fuel to the fire.
Stick to jokes, not propaganda.
Ivo Pentchev
By emailPeter Gray’s comments (Flight In-
ternational, 27 January-2 Febru-
ary) are misleading.
Loss of control of an airworthy
aircraft can only result from mis-
handling by the pilot. There can
be no other cause.
The Air France Habsheim ac-
cident was a regular flight au-
thorised to take part in a presen-
tation by a pilot bereft of flight
demonstration experience and
with limited type experience. If
the aircraft is over-rotated, cen-
trifugal force can cause at least
some of the air to “spin” off the
rotor disc starving the engines of
air. This may well have contrib-
uted in this accident. The pilot
did not lose control, but perhaps
through lack of experience he
simply got it wrong.
AF447 was utterly different: a
routine flight, it encountered
what in truth was a minor nui-
sance, the crew did not “lose
control”, they reacted incorrect-
ly, and counter to all good air-
manship. Worse yet, they failed
over several minutes to seek to
react properly or think things
through. As a result they and
their passengers paid the ulti-
mate price. Neither of these acci-
dents was loss of control.
Try as aircraft and avionics
manufacturers may, the old say-
ing: “You can make a thing fool-
proof but you can’t make it
damn-fool proof” holds good.
The secret lies not in more
complex avionics and smarter
aircraft; it lies simply in the moredifficult task of removing or edu-
cating the damn fools.
The solution is a crew compe-
tent in hands-on flying, and alert
and situationally aware through-
out – using automated systems as
aid and backup, not as a primary
flight system. Surely that is what
they are paid for?
Richard Chandless
Crêches sur Saône, FranceTraining courses to take you there
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