Plain Language Translations of American Divorce Law
151explained and are sometimes contrary to presumed notions. Also,
Americans with legal problems often suffer from a variety of different
types of legal matters at the same time. The mix of legal and social issues
can be incredibly complex, and parsing out the various causes and
correlations requires much more in-depth analysis than we can currently
get from the current style of court-based research.
In the context of the need for better research, both the U.S. Department
of Justice and the National Science Foundation have joined with the Self
Represented Litigation Network, the American Bar Association, the
National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, and the Conference of Chief
Justices to call for more research. A two-day workshop for researchers was
held in December 2012, and funding in general has increased.
Unfortunately, I think that one serious point has been missed in the
debate. The evidence-based research and subsequent program revisions
have certainly improved lots of processes. Nevertheless, the core problem
is, and remains, the lack of understanding of the law and court procedure
by average Americans (Zorza 2002: 17-18). It is a problem of meaning,
and to me, the best aid to understanding meaning is cognitive linguistics.^1
So I share with you my observations of one facet of the larger problem
of American justice systems. This one is at least aimed at the heart of the
problem of meaning comprehension by average Americans. Plain
language translations are generally recognized by members of the Self
Represented Litigation Network as the beginning point for the systematic
improvement of services to those Americans who go to court without
lawyers. I intend to walk through the plain language process as it is
presently practiced in American courts, to note those findings of worth by
plain language experts, and to further note my thoughts on how such
findings might be more insightful if cognitive linguistics considerations
are taken into account.
Since these matters occur in other countries as well, I presume that
many cognitive linguist readers can take my remarks and associate them in
their own country’s context. I further hope that I inspire some readers to
(^1) There have been other attempts at trying to apply principles of cognitive science
to plain language translations. Suffolk University Law Professor Julie A. Baker has
sought to apply findings from cognitive psychology on “cognitive fluency” to
make the case for plain language translations (Baker 2011). She seems right to
point out that plain language court forms, for instance, generate more favorable
reaction from non-lawyers and are thus more acceptable, because they are more
cognitively fluent. Perhaps for that reason alone, they should indeed be accepted
by the legal community.