The aircraft was unpressurised but could climb
to higher altitudes with the crew on oxygen.
“As we were ying towards our barrier line,
we determined the level of the isothermal
layer, as that easily screwed up our radar
performance.”
Several issues also markedly reduced
the radars’ effectiveness – including general
weather, sea state and surface shipping – so
crews generally calculated their optimum
operating altitude for the day during their transit.
David explained: “The sea state,
in particular, often adversely affected
performance. In the North Sea, searching
eastwards in westerly winds, the radar looked
out ‘over’ the waves – so there was a smaller
sea return, making it easier to distinguish
aircraft from the sea clutter.
“When on station we were pretty much
operating beyond the range of the ground-
based radars and ground control intercept
[GCI] stations.
“We often saw the targets coming in
long before the sector control or the ghter
controllers. There were really two options
available to us. We could relay the tracks
of incoming aircraft to the ground stations,
known as ‘Voice Tell’ until they detected them,
or talk the ghters onto the approaching
targets ourselves from the Shackleton.
“As the air battle developed it was
sometimes frustrating from the Shackleton’s
mission crew point of view. We were
able to set up the intercepts from greater
distances but were often reduced to just
reporting position changes, because the
ghter controllers didn’t want to release their
authority for the engagement to our crew.“But when it worked properly we exercised
with Phantoms out of Leuchars or Coningsby
or Lightnings from Binbrook, altogether as
one unit under the sector master controller.”
In theory, the squadron covered the
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap but rarely got that
far although, said David, “we did sometimes
get up to Ke avík in Iceland”.
He added: “We kept an aircraft on QRA
[quick reaction alert] at two hours’ standby,
although it was usually airborne much
quicker. But even when launched it took along time, often more than three hours, to get
anywhere at our cruising speed of around
160kts [184mph].” The long transit times also
enabled the radar to warm up properly.
“We mostly helped with intercepts of Soviet
Tu-95 Bears crossing the Iceland-Faroe Islands
Gap, heading for Cuba or West Africa, and at
other times aircraft operating in the North Sea
off the UK and Norway,” David noted.
The AN/APS-20F performed well against
large aircraft like the Bears, but less so with
more modern, streamlined aircraft – David
saying: “When we worked with the Danes and
Norwegians, their F-16s were often sneaky
little beasts trying to evade us.”
The 1981 Defence White Paper, under
Conservative Defence Secretary John Nott,
saw the Shackleton AEW force halved to
just six aircraft – justi ed at the time on the
basis of saving money; and anticipating the
rst replacement Nimrod AEWs would enter
squadron service during 1983. As a result, 8
Squadron’s QRA responsibility was reduced
to a weekday-only capability.DIY ‘HUSH’ KIT
A far from usual sound barrier also faced
crews in this ageing aircraft as they struggled
to hear all radio transmissions.
“Shackletons were always noisy aircraft
internally,” said David. “But in the AEW.2
the noise really got to you. By then, all the
original rubber seals around the hatches had
perished. So, one important task after take-
off was to pass a loo roll up front and use it
to block up all the cracks, reducing the noise
considerably.
“We needed as much quiet as possible32 Aviation News incorporating Jets September 2017“The intention
initially was for 8
Sqn to rapidly build
up experience by
becoming a joint RAF/
Royal Navy unit to
benefi t from the FAA
operators’ considerable
experience with the
AN/APS-20F radar.”
Top: Shackletons regularly ew AEW patrols
up to 100 miles off the coast on the look-out
for intruders. Key Collection
Below: Two Shackletons on the 8 Sqn line
at Lossiemouth with a 226 Operational
Conversion Unit Jaguar behind. Peter R Foster28-33_shackletonDC.mfDC.mf.mfDC.mfDC.indd 32 04/08/2017 17:41