Flight International — 22 August — 4 September 2017

AIR TRANSPORT

16 | Flight International | 22 August-4 September 2017 flightglobal.com

I

nvestigators have found that the

undetected release of the park-

ing brake and the premature re-

moval of chocks led to an EasyJet

Airbus A320 suffering damage as

it rolled backwards at Lon-

don Gatwick airport.

The crew had already carried

out cockpit preparation checks,

which included checking that the

parking brake was on.

Maintenance personnel subse-

quently probed a braking system

defect, which had occurred on

the previous sector, and this re-

quired the parking brake to be off.

But there was “no require-

ment” to put the parking brake

back on once the task was com-

pleted, the UK’s Air Accidents

Investigation Branch says, and

the crew was left “unaware” that

it had been released.

The A320 (G-EZTM) was

chocked at the time but, after a

tug was attached for pushback,

the chocks were removed – in

breach of the operator’s proce-

dures because the forward board-

ing stairs were still in position.

Investigators state that the tug

driver found that the radio was

not functioning and – without

communicating with the aircraft

crew – disconnected the tug with

a view to using a different vehicle.

This released the unchocked

aircraft and it rolled backwards,

sustaining damage to its forward

left-hand exit door as well as its

fuselage as it struck the stairs.

The crew halted the movement

with footbrakes.

None of the 168 occupants was

injured during the event, which

occurred on 26 March this year. ■

R

ussian investigators have de-

tailed the meandering flight-

path taken by a Polar Airlines

Antonov An-26 before it landed

outside the runway after a low-

visibility approach to Belaya

Gora in Russia’s north-east.

The aircraft (RA-26660) had

been conducting the OGBEN2 ar-

rival pattern to the airport follow-

ing a service from Yakutsk on

11 October 2016.

Its approach to Belaya Gora’s

runway 07 required travelling

downwind at a height of 500m

(1,640ft) before turning left on to

the base leg and descending to

400m, maintaining this height

while turning left on to the ex-

tended centreline, and then com-

mencing descent on the glide-

path at a distance of 4.64nm

(8.6km) from the runway.

But the crew opted to begin the

turn on to the base leg early, at a

height of 775m, cutting the cor-

ner, says Russia’s Interstate Avia-

tion Committee. This effectively

reduced the width of the arrival

pattern from 2.15nm to  1.97nm.

Instead of following a rectilin-

ear course, the turns on to the

base leg and the turn on to final

approach were “coupled”, says

the inquiry. But while the crew

selected the correct speed and

bank to reach the turn on to final,

the inquiry says they “did not

consider” the direction and

speed of the wind.

The An-26 overshot the centre-

line by 700m, some 6.2nm from

the runway, still flying at 575m.

As it continued its left turn, at-

tempting to establish itself on the

final approach, it overshot the

centreline a second time, also by

around 700m, before correcting

to the right and aligning on the

approach path.

Investigators determined that

the crew was using a Garmin GPS

satellite receiver for navigation,

rather than the ARK-11 naviga-

tion system on board the aircraft.

Weather conditions were de-

teriorating at Belaya Gora, but

the pilots were not told of the

visibility level, which was

below minimum requirements,

and opted to continue the ap-

proach.

The inquiry says the aircraft

had sufficient fuel to execute a

missed approach and proceed to

an alternate airport – either

Moma to the south or

Chokurdakh to the north.

The aircraft was 3.5nm from

the runway, at a height of 270m,

when the crew told air traffic con-

trol that they had the runway

in sight.

But the inquiry has queried

the crew’s claims that the run-

way was visible. While the in-

quiry believes the crew could see

the airport as the aircraft turned

on to final approach, the subse-

quent deterioration in visibility,

due to snow, meant the crew

could not have seen the runway

at that distance.

Some 1.88nm before the run-

way the An-26’s descent rate in-

creased to 4m/s (790ft/min) and

the aircraft began to dip below

the glidepath. It was about 10m

below the glidepath at 1.5nm.

The inquiry points out that the

aircraft’s position could have

been controlled on the final ap-

proach using the ARK-11 system

and the information relayed by

the navigator.

But the crew allowed the air-

craft to drift to the left and, at a

distance of 1.34nm and 100m

height, it was 50m off the centre-

line. The aircraft passed 190m to

the left of the non-directional

beacon, rather than over it, at a

height of just 20m, instead of the

required 70m.

As a result of being too low,

says the inquiry, the crew could

not see the airport’s lights –

which were at full intensity – and

the An-26 touched down 390m

short of the runway and 230m to

the left of its centreline.

Although the aircraft was sub-

stantially damaged, all 33 occu-

pants survived. ■

For the analysis of airline safety and

losses in the first half of 2017, go to:

flightglobal.com/safety

Flightcrew failed to consider wind speed and direction during incident

Regis Sibille/Wikimedia Commons

INVESTIGATION DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

Early turn in An-26 descent

behind Polar landing mishap

Turboprop touched down short and to right of the runway after low-visibility approach

SAFETY

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW

LONDON

EasyJet’s chock

horror as A

rolls backwards

Weather conditions

were deteriorating at

Belaya Gora, but the

pilots were not told of

the visibility level

The crew was left

unaware that the

parking brake had

been released