Aeroplane – June 2018

(Romina) #1
98 http://www.aeroplanemonthly.com AEROPLANE JULY 2018

CANCELLATION FAIREY ROTODYNE


T


he government’s
involvement with the
Rotodyne lasted
around a dozen years,
and for most of that period it
was the subject of sharp
disagreement within Whitehall
and Westminster. But while
there were some in the
corridors of power who
welcomed its cancellation, one
man at least allowed his regret
to show.
Announcing the project’s
cancellation in the Commons,
aviation minister Peter
Thorneycroft — ironically, the
government’s premier
Rotodyne supporter —
acknowledged his “regret that
what I had hoped was a
promising engineering project
cannot be carried through to
fulfi lment.”
He was not alone. Several
cabinet colleagues, including
Duncan Sandys, successively
defence minister and aviation
minister, and Harold Watkinson
who succeeded Sandys in both
posts, were also Rotodyne
supporters. Even Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan was
intrigued by it. He wrote in
1958, “This seems an exciting

project and I would like to
know what are its potentialities
and possibilities”. Ranged
against the project, however,
were the Treasury and the RAF
supported by senior Air
Ministry offi cials.
There was even a division of
opinion within defence circles.
The army’s interest in the
Rotodyne had stemmed from a
War Offi ce paper of October
1958 which outlined a
requirement for a VTOL aircraft
able to carry a three-ton
payload over 200 miles. The
Rotodyne and Westland
Westminster were subsequently
evaluated and the Fairey
product emerged as best-
suited to meet the army’s
needs. Accordingly, a cabinet
committee chaired by
Macmillan himself accepted in
principle the need for a military
variant of the Tyne-Rotodyne.
In August 1959 the
government agreed to

reimburse all Fairey’s
development costs should a
specifi c minimum production
order not be placed. But this
wasn’t enough. In December
Sandys told the Commons that
Fairey wanted additional
fi nancial assistance.
The cabinet had concluded
by January 1960 that there was
a need for 18 Rotodynes, but
by then the consolidation of
the British aerospace industry
was in its fi nal stages. Westland
was swiftly contracted by the
government to develop the
Tyne-Rotodyne and the
government announced that
the Rotodyne would proceed
as a joint civil-military project. It
also said it was prepared to
contribute half the
development costs up to a
maximum of £4 million.
Despite the enthusiasm of
defence minister Harold
Watkinson, offi cials and senior
RAF offi cers were quietly

building a case against the
Rotodyne. The Air Staff had
accepted the requirement for
the machine “without
enthusiasm” and now the RAF
had persuaded the army that it
didn’t need it. Its requirements
would be better met by
fi xed-wing STOL aircraft, which
would be easier to operate and
maintain than the Rotodyne,
and a good deal cheaper. The
aircraft’s unit cost had already
risen from £550,000 to around
£1 million and the aircraft’s
expected payload over a
200-mile radius had now fallen
from seven tons to 4.75. And it
wouldn’t be ready before 1966.
At that stage the RAF’s
preference in the light cargo
role was the STOL-capable de
Havilland Canada DHC-4
Caribou. BEA was also having
doubts, mainly because of the
noise issue. By mid-1960 the
airline had still not placed an
order for the Rotodyne. Its
chairman, Lord Douglas of
Kirtleside, asked the
government for an undertaking
that if it was prevented
because of noise from using
the Rotodynes for city centre
operations it would not be

Killed off before its time,


or an inevitable end?


It now seems debatable whether
the city-to-city market the
Rotodyne was intended to serve
ever really existed. LEONARDO

Aviation minister Peter Thorneycroft wrote in
March 1961, “Potentially, there is no more
promising helicopter in the world”

85-100_AM_Database_July18_cc C.indd 98 04/06/2018 17:01

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