The signified that I attribute to what I or others say or think at any given moment in time
can consciously be “lived” only in a single way. All that I say and all that I hear must nec-
essarily have for me,at a given time, one univocal signification.
To exemplify the difference between the diachronic dimension of the conscious signify-
ing chain (that of the signified) and the synchronic dimension of the unconscious sig-
nifying chains (that of the signifier), think of the uncanny experience we have when we
listen to our own taped voice: literally, “we do not recognize our own words.” This is to
say that, as a consequence of the non-bi-univocal relation between the signifier and the
signified, we (retroactively) actualize (render conscious) a virtual process of significa-
tion which was (unconsciously) synchronic to that which we (consciously) experienced
at the moment when our voice was originally taped. Two conclusions can be drawn from
this: ( 1 ) Virtual processes of signification are not lost: on the contrary, they are registered
in the “other scene,” the unconscious. The unconscious is a sort of tape recorder. ( 2 ) The
existence of another scene implies that, at the level of the Symbolic, there are parallel
signifying universes. Clearly, this is not just virtually valid at the intrasubjective level: suf-
fice it to recall how our intersubjective daily experience with other human beings as be-
ings of language is fundamentally based on misunderstandings. In other words, the Other
(subject) who always interprets my words in a way I did not intend him to interpret them already actualizes—
in that which is signified by him—a fraction of “my” unconscious....
55 .The Seminar. Book III,p. 167.
See, for example, ibid.
Ibid., p. 189.
I shall analyze this formula at the beginning of Chapter 5.
See especially R. Jakobson, Essais de linguistique générale(Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 19 63).
For the following paragraph on Jakobson, I rely on Lemaire, Jacques Lacan,pp.30‒34.
In addition to associations of meaning (synonyms and antonyms), phonological associ-
ations are also possible.
Lemaire, Jacques Lacan,p. 30.
Ibid., p. 31.
This is why Juranville can state: “Lacan introduces the idea of the autonomy of the sig-
nifier. This certainly does not imply that the signifier may exist without the signified. But
the signified is producedby the signifier” (A. Juranville, Lacan et la philosophie[Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2003 ], pp.47‒ 48).
See Écrits: A Selection,pp.163‒164.
I think that on the basis of my account it is possible to understand why Lacan enigmati-
cally states that metaphor has “two sides” (deux versants), one of which is explicitly said to
be metonymic (Le séminaire livre V,p. 44 ).
As we may clearly observe in schema 2. 3 , unconscious metonymy is not necessarily “ver-
tical”: here, the important point to grasp is that, whether “vertical” or “horizontal,” the
“linearity” of unconscious metonymic combinations is continuously fragmented and
“redirected” by metaphor/repression.