- seCtIon tHRee: BoDY AnD WoRLD
Libet’s conscious mental field (CMF) also acts
both ways, providing in one direction ‘the medi-
ator between the physical activities of nerve cells
and the emergence of subjective experience’, and
in the other ‘a causal ability to affect or alter some
neuronal functions’ (Libet, 2004, p. 168).
These theories unambiguously answer our ques-
tion. When an action is carried out consciously,
the self-conscious mind or the CMF causes the
brain to carry it out by interacting with it; when an
action is carried out unconsciously, the brain acts
alone. But the interactions remain unexplained.
British psychologist Jeffrey Gray calls dualism
‘moribund’ (2004, p. 73) but also tries to retain
a causal role for ‘consciousness in its own right’
(p. 90). He proposes that ‘The decision [to act]
is made by the unconscious brain and enters
conscious awareness only after the event’ (p. 92).
Consciousness itself monitors features relevant
to ongoing motor programs, and permits change
in the variables controlled by unconscious servo-
mechanisms, or feedback-based controllers. For
Gray, qualia are ‘raw feels’ created by the brain which, once created, can be put to
use in a great variety of cognitive processes. How either conversion process works
is unexplained, but the answer to our question would presumably be that only in
conscious actions are qualia put to use.
Finally, there is global workspace theory (Chapter 5). According to Bernard Baars,
consciousness is a supremely functional biological adaptation. It is a kind of gate-
way: ‘a facility for accessing, disseminating, and exchanging information, and for
exercising global coordination and control’ (1997b, p. 7). The nine functions of con-
sciousness include being ‘essential in integrating perception, thought, and action,
in adapting to novel circumstances, and in providing information to a self-system’
(p. x). He firmly rejects the idea ‘that consciousness simply has no causal role to
play in the nervous system’ (p. 165).
Baars illustrates the power of consciousness with the following example. Imagine
that as you are reading this book, you become aware of a strange, foetid animal
smell, the noise of heavy hooves, and hot breath down the back of your neck.
Although reluctant to stop reading, you suddenly have the wild thought that
there might be a large animal in the room. You turn your head, see the large
angry ferocious bull, and leap from your chair. Consciousness, at least in our evo-
lutionary past, would have saved us from danger, he says. The problem with this
interpretation lies in the timing. The results of many experiments suggest that
you would have leapt out of that chair long before you could have consciously
thought about the danger (Chapter 9).
On Baars’s theory, the answer to our question is that actions which are performed
consciously are shaped by conscious feedback while unconscious actions are not.
For example, you might unconsciously make a speech error, but when you hear
BRAINMIND INTERACTION
OUTER SENSE INNER SENSE
World 2
Interface
World 1
LIAISON BRAIN
PERCEPTION WILL
Light
Colour
Sound
Smell
Ta ste
Pain
Touch
Thoughts
Feelings
Memories
Dreams
Imaginings
Intentions
The Ego
The Self
The Soul
FIGURE 8.2 • How the brain interacts with the
mind, according to Popper and
Eccles. The three components
of World 2 (mental) are outer
sense, inner sense, and the ego
or self, shown here with their
connectivities. Also shown are the
lines of communication between
World 1 (physical) and World 2,
i.e. from the liaison brain to and
from these World 2 components.
The area of the liaison brain has
a columnar arrangement, and
is supposed to be enormous,
including a hundred thousand or
more open modules (Popper and
Eccles, 1977, p. 360).