that question cannot be answered because see-
ing is not all or nothing but depends on the nor-
mal convergence of affect and bodily behaviours
(including verbal responses), and in blindsight this
normal convergence is disrupted. Hence we end up
not knowing whether see is the right word to use.
But maybe our words and our definitions are the
problem.
Milner and Goodale agree. ‘Blindsight is paradoxical
only if one regards vision as a unitary process’ (Milner
and Goodale, 1995, p. 86). In fact, there is no single
visual representation that is used for all purposes,
but lots of semi-independent subsystems like those
in the ventral and dorsal streams. The mystery of
consciousness does not disappear but looks quite
different for those who abandon the idea of unified
consciousness, a single picture in the mind, a show
in the Cartesian theatre, or ‘a bogus concept of intro-
spection and privileged access’ (Bennett and Hacker,
2003, p. 396).
Maybe we need to remember that for all their dif-
ferences in emphasis, the two streams are both part
of a single system: ‘perception’ and ‘action’ are not
neatly separable, and when perceptual informa-
tion of one kind is lacking, it can be supplemented
by another kind (Wilson, 2012). This ties in with
arguments about the sensorimotor basis of vision
(Chapter 3) and with what we know about neural
plasticity and sensory substitution. Clean distinc-
tions between brain areas responsible for x, y, and
z are always tempting, and are encouraged by
research involving individuals with unusual kinds
of brain damage affecting specific areas, as well as
by the kinds of technology we use to investigate
the brain (Chapter 4). But if we jump to the conclu-
sion that some areas are responsible for conscious
experience and others for unconscious processes,
the water gets murkier still.
Before we turn to one last example of the claimed power of consciousness, we
can return to answer our questions about that scrumpled paper ball. The find-
ings we have surveyed suggest that conscious perception of the ball depends
on processing that is separate from and too slow to play a role in guiding the
fast catch. So, although the causal sequence seems to be 1) consciously per-
ceive, and 2) act on the basis of conscious experience, we now know that it
cannot be.‘Blindsight is
paradoxical only if
one regards vision as a
unitary process’
(Milner and Goodale, 1995, p. 86)
in which the sensory systems of ferrets are rewired soon
after birth. If visual information is routed to auditory cor-
tex, that cortex develops orientation-selective responses,
maps of visual space, and control of visual behaviour as
visual cortex normally would (sur and Leamey, 2001). In
other words, it seems as though the nature of the input
helps structure sensory cortex.
these kinds of research might help solve a classic mystery:
how the firing of some neurons leads to visual experiences
while identical kinds of firing in different neurons leads
to auditory experiences (o’Regan, 2011). Perhaps more
important for people who are blind, it suggests that seeing
does not necessarily need eyes.FIGURE 8.14 • Pat Fletcher, shown here with Peter Meijer
(left) and David Chalmers (right), is seeing with
‘Soundscapes’, also known as ‘The vOICe’ (get it?).
She wears headphones and has tiny video cameras
concealed in her glasses. A notebook computer
in her rucksack carries out the video-to-audio
transformations that enable her to see well enough
to walk about, pick up objects, and even recognise
people. But is it seeing? She says it is.