- seCtIon FoUR: eVoLUtIon
Dennett, D. C. (1998). The practical requirements
for making a conscious robot. In D. C. Dennett, Brain-
children: Essays on designing minds (pp. 151–170).
London: Penguin.
Dennett’s involvement in the Cog project, reflecting on
embodiment, symbol grounding, and whether an AI
could ever care about anything, or be an authority on
its own internal states.
Harnad, S. (2007). Can a machine be conscious?
How? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10 (4–5),
67–75.
How this question relates to the problem of other minds,
and how Turing-testing (inferring mental states from
behaviours) is our only possible response to both.
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 , 417–457. (Also
reprinted in Hofstadter and Dennett, 1981, with com-
mentary by Hofstadter, pp. 353–382.)
Searle’s classic paper on the Chinese room, and its
many responses.
Sloman, A. and Chrisley, R. (2003). Virtual
machines and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 10 (4–5), 133–172.
Argues that building artificial systems (like the CogAff
architecture) can contribute to the study of conscious-
ness, including sections on qualia, zombies, introspec-
tion, and evolution.
Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intel-
ligence. Mind, 59 , 433–460. (Partially reprinted with
commentary in Hofstadter and Dennett, 1981.)
A classic on the question ‘can machines think?’