- seCtIon sIx: seLF AnD otHeR
attention to experience can lead people to per-
ceive change occurring but with no apparent
distinction between past and future (Black-
more, 2011). This suggests that a search for
the origins of nowness may be a search for an
interesting kind of illusion.
Varela’s ambitions have been taken further
by a new kind of brain imaging called iGBM
(intracranial gamma-band mapping), which
measures gamma-band activity between 40
and 50 Hz as a general index of neural process-
ing. It has much greater temporal resolution
than fMRI, and is precise enough in a single
trial that the signal-to-noise ratio doesn’t need
improving by averaging across multiple trials.
These features make it better for exploring sin-
gular experiences of individuals. But they also
demand more precision from those individuals
if the available resolution is to be useful. Claire
Petitmengin and Jean-Philippe Lachaux (2013)
argue that to maximise our chances of inte-
grating the neural and the experiential, we must attend to the smallest temporal
unit of experience, changing participants’ focus of attention from what (e.g. what
they are listening to) to how (how the experience changes over time, how much
effort is involved, what its effects are, etc.). For them, the study of ‘microdynamics’
provides access to early and usually invisible stages of our cognitive processes,
where the distinction between the sensorial modalities, and between the
‘subject’ and ‘object’ poles seems to be less rigid than in later stages. We
hypothesize that these early stages give us a glimpse on the process of
co-constitution of subject and object, knower and known that is called
‘enaction’.
(p. 5)
To help us understand where neurophenomenology fits into a science of con-
sciousness, Varela (1996) provides a simple diagram with four directions in which
theories of consciousness can go. He positions the best-known thinkers on it, but
excludes quantum theories and dualism, and restricts himself to ‘ “naturalistic
approaches’ ”: those which ‘provide a workable link to current research on cogni-
tive science’ (p. 332). In the north, Varela places functionalist theories, suggesting
that they are the most popular in cognitive science, and that they all rely entirely
on ‘third-person’ data and validation. Opposite them, in the south, are the mys-
terians who claim that the hard problem is insoluble. In the east are the reduc-
tionists, epitomised by the Churchlands, and Crick and Koch, who aim to reduce
experience to neuroscience. Opposite them, to the west, comes phenomenology,
with an area cordoned off for those who believe that a first-person account is
essential, including Varela himself.
This diagram is helpful for thinking about the relationships between different the-
ories, and it also puts a spotlight on the role of first-person approaches in a science
‘I can’t grasp a moment
from which to say that
what has gone before
is past and what is to
come next is future’
(Blackmore, 2011, p. 95)
‘If a bridge is to be built
between the neural and
experiential levels, it
should be done where
the river is shallow,
where descriptions of
mental processes are
fine-grained on both
sides’
(Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013,
p. 1)
Functionalism
Mysterianism
Phenomenology Reductionism
First-person
accountessential
Bears Dennett
Edelmen
Calvin
Churchland
Jackendoff
Velmans
Varela
Globus
Searle
McGinn Nagel
Crick-Koch
mers
agan
Lekoff-Johns
Consciousness
FIGURE 17.3 • Varela devised this two-
dimensional scheme for
categorising theories of
consciousness. Use it to try to
position as many theories as
you can. Don’t turn the page
until you’ve done it.