aspecific physical capacity from birth? Is it, in other words, a product of
nature or of culture? (And if nature, what made nature evolve that way,
we might ask).
One empirical background out of which this argument plausibly
emerges is the fact that children generally learn language with great
speed, suggesting that they are at least preadapted to doing so. Also,
children learn language in definable stages, regardless of which particular
language it is, again suggesting that an innate kind of‘knowledge’guides
them (Everett, pp. 67–68). One element of controversy is whether there is
a critical period for language learning, which makes later acquisition of
languages harder. This is probably true, and for a number of reasons, none
of which requires an idea of innate grammatical knowledge, but all of which
require a general learning capacity. First-language acquisition is oral and
social, and success in it is overdetermined. Second-language acquisition
through books or formal classes is quite different and often combined with
the need to learn many other technical forms of knowledge. This is why the
immersion method, replicating aspects of oralfirst-language acquisition, is
considered to be more effective, whenever this option is available. (When
languages no longer spoken are involved, of course, this option cannot be
realized, but a kind of intensive text-based immersion can substitute for it.)
Furthermore there are no predefined areas of the brain exclusively dedi-
cated to language, although such areas can develop with experience
(Everett, p. 73). Instead the brain works in more plastic and polyvalent
ways. Specialization develops with learning and experience, in other words,
via cultural means.
The bread and butter of practical linguists who study different languages
is that languages vary in their grammar. Some universal features may be
found as tendencies but not as predominant overall patterns (Everett,
p. 85). If there was a uniform species-specific language system in the
brain, uniformity would be greater than it is, Everett concludes. If, then,
there are few linguistic universals (other than, we might note, language
itself) the likelihood that there is an innate universal grammar becomes very
faint. Theorists of the brain could more easily agree, however, that the
brain is‘a good problem-solver’and so could develop language to solve a
problem of communication just like it can enable the development of any
tool needed for survival.
In response to difficulties of this kind, Chomsky and his associates
distinguished between broad and narrow faculties for language (Everett,
p. 89). The broad faculty is said to comprise a number of enabling
8 LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 71