FlyPast 03.2018

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but managed to successfully draw
them away from Pham Tuan. This
increased the latter’s chances of
getting a clean shot at a B-52.
Flying over thick layers of cloud,
Pham Tuan in MiG-21 ‘Red 5040’

• found that the sky was getting
  darker as he headed westwards. He
  then headed south and turned on
  the automatic pilot. He calculated
  that he was between the areas of Na
  San and Son La, about 120 miles
  west of Hanoi.
  He then received reports from the
  ground station at Moc Chau telling
  him to fly heading 220° at 6,000ft
  (19,700ft). A few minutes later he
  was told that the target was on his
  left and 40 miles away.
  As Pham Tuan was closing in on
  his victim, the B-52s were receiving
  a barrage of SAMs. (The North’s
  ground forces later claimed two
  bombers shot down, one of them
  crashing onto the village of Ngoc
  Ha.) In the midst of all this, three
  MiGs were scrambled into this
  inferno, having to dodge unguided
  SAMs and F-4s alike.
  Meanwhile, back at command
  HQ, Dinh Luyen could see all the
  red markers that showed him the
  positions of his MiGs. He could see
  Pham Tuan was slowly approaching
  his B-52. At this point, Dinh Luyen
  instructed his deputy Tran Manh
  to order Pham Tuan to join in
  the attack on the third group of
  bombers, as this was the smallest
  group. The four MiGs that were in
  charge of the Hoa Binh area were
  still covering them.
  The control centre at Moc Chau
  then ordered Pham Tuan to drop
  his tanks and proceed south. He
  was vectored to a heading of 030°
  and was told the target was only 18
  miles ahead.
  He very stealthily closed in on

the giant bomber undetected. He

broke radio silence and informed

his commanding officer he had

visual on the target. Radar operator

Le Thiet Hung replied: “Target

on your right, ‘Black Crows’ [F-4

Phantoms] on the left.”

Over the Fence

To Pham Tuan, the whole

squadron of B-52s seemed to stand

still, with large numbers of F-4s

flying in pattern on all sides of the

bombers (at least 20 in number.)

The commander then instructed

Pham Tuan to “go over the fence”,

shoot past the F-4s and go for the

kill.

By then the target was less than

12 miles ahead. He could now see

the different light patterns of the

bombers and their escorts. Then

he spotted two red lights of a B-52

ahead and followed them.

Ground control confirmed the

distance as 12 miles as he homed in

on the bomber. He then shifted the

MiG to his right and saw the blue

lights of the bomber.

At 26,000ft, the MiG’s cruising

speed was not much faster than the

B-52’s, so Pham Tuan had to use

greater acceleration; the problem was

that this would light up his exhaust

in the dark, warning the Americans

of his presence. He then decided

to cruise along and creep up on the

bomber.

Without warning, two blue streaks

flew past his MiG. These were

missiles - he had been spotted. He

knew any idea of creeping up on

the bomber had to be abandoned,

so he speeded up, not caring about

detection, and zoomed in on his

target.

He felt the sky was suddenly full

of F-4s all gunning for him. He was

now only two miles from the bomber,

knowing any second could be his last

as he continued closing the gap.

When he was close enough to

attack, he accelerated again, lighting

up the entire sky around him in the

process. He knew the Americans

were now afraid to shoot missiles

at him for fear of hitting their own

bomber, and it would take too long

for them to close in for a cannon

attack.

He closed in to 1,800 yards...

1,650 yards... 1,450 yards... 1,250

yards... then 1,100 yards and he

could actually see the B-52 in the

darkness. Tense with excitement, he

fired two missiles, then another two,

then dropped his MiG by 9,000ft.

Looking up, he saw “a burning black

block in the sky”. Jubilantly, he

reported to base: “Four-Zero, mission

over, big burning, big burning.” He

landed without further incident.

The above combat was reported at

length to show how important the

shooting down of a B-52 was to the

North Vietnamese, but it also gives

an interesting inside view on how

this type of mission was repeated

numerous other times from 1964 to

1975.

The Linebacker campaign of

December 1972 has been acclaimed

as a textbook example of how air

power can cripple the enemy by

selective bombing, and it could be

seen as a precursor of the Kosovo

bombings of 1999, which were part

of NATO operations against the-

then Yugoslavia. The Americans flew

714 B-52 sorties, 830 USAF tactical

sorties and 386 US Navy and marine

sorties. In reply the VPAF launched

1,293 SAMs.

These bare bones may be generally

correct but the fact remained that

American aircraft were continuously

being intercepted and shot down

by MiGs and other ground-to-air

defences. Though the Americans

dispute this, total air supremacy was

never achieved and this is essential

if any bombing campaign is to be

completely successful.

fired two missiles, then another two,

then dropped his MiG by 9,000ft.

Above left

A group of pilots in

high-altitude pressure

suits during night-fi ghter

training for the MiG-21PF

with ‘Red 4321’ behind.

Above

A propaganda image

taken at Gia Lâm airfi eld

showing pilots walking

away from some very

clean MiG-21s.

ALL VIA AUTHOR