Leaders 9O
ne hundred days ago Vladimir Putin launched his inva-
sion of Ukraine by warning of a nuclear strike. Having exalt-
ed Russia’s atomic arsenal and promised Ukraine’s subjugation,
he threatened countries tempted to interfere with consequences
“such as you have never seen in your entire history”. Russian tv
has since tantalised viewers with chit-chat about Armageddon.
Even if he never uses the bomb in Ukraine, Mr Putin has thus
already upset the nuclear order. After his threats, natolimited
the support it was prepared to offer, with two implications that
are all the more worrying for having been drowned out by the
drumbeat of Russia’s conventional campaign. One is that vul-
nerable states that see the world through Ukraine’s eyes will feel
that the best defence against a nuclear-armed aggressor is to
have weapons of their own. The other is that other nuclear-
armed states will believe that they can gain by copying Mr Pu-
tin’s tactics. If so, someone somewhere will surely turn their
threat into reality. That must not be this war’s devastating legacy.
The nuclear danger was growing before the invasion. North
Korea has dozens of warheads. Iran, the unsaid this week, has
enough enriched uranium for its first bomb. Although the New
starttreaty will limit Russia’s and America’s intercontinental
ballistic missiles until 2026, it does not cover weapons such as
nuclear torpedoes. Pakistan is rapidly adding to its arsenal. Chi-
na is modernising its nuclear forces and, the
Pentagon says, expanding them.
All this proliferation reflects the weakening
of the moral revulsion that restrains the use of
nuclear weapons (see Briefing). As memories of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade, people fail to
grasp how the detonation of a small battlefield
weapon, of the sort Mr Putin might lob, could
escalate into the tit-for-tat annihilation of en-
tire cities. America and the Soviet Union only just coped with a
two-sided nuclear stand-off. There is insufficient alarm at the
prospect of many nuclear powers struggling to keep the peace.
The invasion of Ukraine adds to this malaise. Even if Mr Putin
is bluffing, his threats eat away at the security guarantees given
to non-nuclear states. In 1994 Ukraine surrendered the ex-Soviet
nuclear weapons on its territory in exchange for undertakings
from Russia, America and Britain that it would not be attacked.
By seizing Crimea and backing separatists in the Donbas regions
in 2014, Russia flagrantly broke that promise. America and Brit-
ain, which pretty much stood aside, broke their promises, too.
This gives vulnerable states an extra reason to go nuclear.
Iran may judge that, whereas renouncing the bomb will win it no
lasting credit, having one would now stir up less trouble than in
the past. If Iran tested a bomb, how would Saudi Arabia and Tur-
key respond? South Korea and Japan, which both have the know-
how to arm themselves, will place less faith in Western commit-
ments to protect them in a more dangerous world.
Mr Putin’s strategy of issuing nuclear threats is even more
corrosive. In the decades after the second world war, the nuclear
powers contemplated deploying atomic weapons in battle. But
in the past half-century such warnings have been issued only
against countries, such as Iraq and North Korea, that were them-selves threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. Mr Putin
is different because he is invoking atomic threats to help his in-
vading forces win a conventional war.
And it seems to have worked. True, nato’s support for Uk-
raine has been more robust than expected. But the alliance has
hesitated to dispatch “offensive” weapons such as aircraft. Al-
though America’s president, Joe Biden, has sent vast amounts of
arms, this week he demurred from providing missiles able to
strike deep inside Russia. Others in natoseem to think that Uk-
raine should settle with Russia, because inflicting a defeat on Mr
Putin could back him into a corner, with dire consequences.
That logic sets a dangerous precedent. China could impose
similar conditions if it attacked Taiwan, arguing that the island
is already Chinese territory. More states may amass more battle-
field weapons. That would flout the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty, under which they are pledged to work for disarmament.
Mr Putin’s damage will be hard to repair. The Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force last year
and is backed by 86 states, calls for their abolition. However,
countries with weapons fear leaving themselves more vulner-
able, even if collective disarmament might make sense.
Arms control, with scrupulous verification, is worth pursu-
ing. Russia may be wary, but it is impoverished. Nukes cost
money and it needs to rebuild its conventional
forces. America could retire its land-based mis-
siles without compromising its security in ex-
change for Russian cuts. Both sides could agree
on technical measures, such as not to strike nu-
clear command, control and communications
infrastructure in a conventional conflict. Ulti-
mately, the aim should be to bring in China.
Those talks will be easier if Mr Putin’s nuc-
lear tactics fail—starting with ensuring he does not strike Uk-
raine. Mr Biden wrote this week that America has not detected
preparations. But countries such as China, India, Israel and Tur-
key with access to the Kremlin should be warning Mr Putin of
their fury if, God forbid, he actually uses a nuclear weapon.
Sparing Ukraine from a nuclear attack is essential, but it is
not enough. The world must also make certain that Mr Putin
does not prosper from his aggression today, as he prospered in- If, once again, he believes that his tactics worked, he will
issue more nuclear threats in the future. If he concludes nato
can be intimidated, persuading him that he must back down will
be harder. Others will learn from his example. Ukraine therefore
needs advanced weapons, economic aid and sanctions on Rus-
sia in order to force Mr Putin’s army into a retreat.
Those countries that see this as just a passing European fight
are neglecting their own security. And those arguing in the name
of peace that Ukraine needs a truce with Russia right now, to
avoid being bogged down in a war it cannot win with an enemy
that has already lost its sting could not be more wrong. If Mr Pu-
tin thought nato lacked resolve Russia would remain danger-
ous. If he were convinced that his nuclear threats had been the
difference between defeat and a face-saving stalemate, Russia
would be more dangerous than ever.
With his threats to use the bomb, Russia’s president has overturned the nuclear orderA new nuclear era