In 1883 Victoria deviated from the British system of ministerial responsi-
bility by creating the Railways Commission with a degree of autonomy from
the minister, in an effort to shield the railways from political interference
(Butlin 1964, pp. 352–7). It was proto-corporatization, but without the inde-
pendent economic regulation of the twentieth century.
This system of corporate governance works best when the ministers confine
the exercise of their ultimate power to matters of genuine importance; and when
the commissioners are paragons of virtue, ability, responsibility, and application.
By international standards, the Victorian commission model was an important
innovation, giving rise to Métin’sfamous‘socialism without doctrine’.Thecom-
mission model was consistent with the spirit of the age, which stressed ministerial
accountability to parliament and enhanced professionalization of the public
service, sought through reforms of the 1880s in Victoria and NSW. The British
administrative‘revolution in government’(Finer 1952; MacDonagh 1977) rever-
berated in the Australian colonies, both through the‘generation of the 1850s’
(Serle 1971, pp. 316–17) and through the efforts ofgovernors such as the enor-
mously energetic Sir HerculesRobinson, governor of NSW.^16
Wettenhall (1961, p. 83) regarded this innovation in public administration
as all the more remarkable because it happened when Victorians were striving
for democratic reforms. The other colonies (and New Zealand, albeit tempor-
arily) soon copied the commission system: South Australia in 1887, NSW and
Queensland in 1888, Western Australia in 1902, and Tasmania in 1910; and it
‘provided the basic framework from which the various [public] corporate
systems of Australia have developed’(Wettenhall 1961, p. 85). However, in
NSW, Sir Henry Parkes insisted on separating the functions of operating
completed lines from that of constructing new lines: all new proposals for
railway or other works were to be referred to a Parliamentary Standing Com-
mittee on Public Works. Although parliamentary questions could be asked of
the responsible minister, the railway commissioners could not be compelled
to answer. Government control was reserved for use if there were serious
excesses or failings on the part of the commissioners (Wettenhall 1961).
Over the subsequent decades, various attempts at improvement were made.
The most important being; the Victorian‘recoup’arrangement, whereby the
railways were compensated for thefinancial detriment imposed by explicit
ministerial directives; the clarification of what was meant for the minister to
have ultimate control, while still allowing autonomy to the commissioners;
and the separation of railways accounts from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
And, as noted, the model became a template, adapted and used widely.^17
(^16) Robinson urged NSW governments to a more rapid rate of railway building (Nairn 1976).
(^17) Parkin (2003) suggested that state policy development was retarded by existence of semi-
autonomous public agencies.
Socialism in Six Colonies: The Aftermath