the times | Wednesday June 8 2022 39
CommentBusiness
Aviation will take two
years to get back to
pre-pandemic levels
A
nalysts in China can’t say
this out loud or in writing,
but this year may be the
one in which it came to
be recognised that
China’s economic miracle is over.
Since February, the closely managed
Chinese yuan has fallen by about
6 per cent against the US dollar, its
fastest decline for a decade. From
the time of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine through to late May, foreign
investors, who poured money into
Chinese equities and bonds in 2020-
21, withdrew a record amount.
While Covid lockdowns were a
factor, the effects of China’s support
for Russia and of its Covid
management will linger for longer
than the short-term bounce driven
by the lifting of restrictions in
Shanghai and Beijing.
GDP may have contracted in the
second quarter by between 5 per
cent to 10 per cent on an annualised
basis, even allowing for a better
June. Freight and passenger traffic in
the year to May were down by 39 per
cent. Property sales at the 100
largest developers were down by
nearly 50 per cent. Sales of cars,
construction equipment and
consumer goods dropped like a stone
and the leisure, hospitality and other
services sectors contracted. The
officially measured unemployment
rate rose to 6.7 per cent, as high as it
was at the start of Covid in 2020 but
now, as then, a large underestimate.
Underlining the severity of the
situation, Li Keqiang, the country’s
premier, held a teleconference on
May 25 with more than 100,000
officials across the country to
emphasise the measures that the
government and the central bank
had introduced to stabilise the
economy. He exhorted them to
implement these immediately, and in
good time for the important 20th
Communist Party Congress later in
the year.
Looking ahead, and subject to
renewed outbreaks of Covid, which
doubtless would trigger the same
zero-Covid policy response, we
should expect the economy to revive
a bit. Lower interest and mortgage
rates, plentiful liquidity, more
infrastructure borrowing and
spending programmes, tax breaks
and other help for firms, as well as
an easing of restrictions on property
developers’ balance sheets are all
likely to give the economy a lift. Yet,
absent statistical manicuring, the
official 5.5 per cent growth target for
2022 is out of reach and the
underlying growth rate this year will
be barely more than 2.5 per cent.
Covid-related factors clearly are
shaping this year’s economy, but it
was in poor shape even before. It is
experiencing an array of structural
headwinds that are weighing heavily
on growth and employment. These
comprise still-rising debt levels and
debt-serving burdens, rapid ageing
and labour force decline, high
income inequality, low productivity
and signs that the property sector,
accounting for about a quarter of
annual GDP, is set to stagnate for
the first time. Meanwhile, China’s
private sector and entrepreneurs are
being coerced by regulations, laws
and arbitrary measures into
pursuing party goals and the
“orderly expansion of capital”.
The rest of the world has not yet
integrated the idea of the end of
China’s growth miracle or that its
trend growth in future is perhaps no
more than 3 per cent. Policymakers
can only determine if this happens
with more or less disruption.
Commentators may still quip that
China will overtake the United
States, but the numbers suggest it
might never happen. In the
meantime, China’s more subdued
outlook suggests that eventually
commodity prices will roll over and
that global inflation will be pulled
one way by higher cost
regionalisation of supply chains and
in the other by weaker Chinese
demand and a cheaper yuan. Formal
decoupling will increase as China
and other countries pursue national
security agendas, while foreign firms
will become more responsive to the
concerns of their home governments
and shareholders. Engagement has
been the lifeblood of a rising China.
Disengagement now looms.
David Smith
George Magnus
There is a
restaurant in west
Wales I know that is
just reopening after
weeks of being
closed because it could not get staff. It
has missed the first few weeks of the
tourist season, but is one of the lucky
ones. Across the country, restaurants
and cafés are being forced to close or
to reduce opening hours because of
staff shortages. The hospitality
industry says there are 400,000 job
vacancies in the sector, which is
higher than the official figure of
171,000, but either number is
enormous.
We know why these problems have
arisen. It is the result of a shrinking
workforce, with lower levels of
employment and rising economic
inactivity among both younger people
aged 18 to 24 and the over-50s. There
is also the additional problem of a
drop of 210,000 in European Union
nationals employed in Britain over
the past two years.
That is the impact of a smaller
workforce. The employment rate
among EU nationals, at 82.9 per cent,
is fractionally higher than it was two
years ago; the employment rate
among UK nationals, of 75.6 per cent,
is lower than it was, the result of a
drop in employment of more than
425,000 among them.
Yet it would be wrong to think that
these post-pandemic strains and
shortages are exclusive to Britain. A
few days ago, I had to go to
Amsterdam on a day trip and, fearful
of disruption and cancelled flights, I
wondered if I would get back. There
was chaos, but the worst of it was at
Schiphol, which vies with Charles De
Gaulle in Paris as Europe’s busiest
airport for passengers. Indeed, chaos
at Schiphol, driven by labour
shortages in an economy
with an even tighter
labour market than
that of the UK and a
3.3 per cent
unemployment
rate, was the talk
of the town. So
was working from
home, with one or
two of those I
spoke to echoing
some British
counterparts in being desperate to get
more people back into the office but
encountering resistance.
It would be easy to see these
difficulties as mere evidence of post-
pandemic teething troubles, but there
is more to it than that. What we used
to call hard-to-fill jobs have become
harder to fill. The time when people
were so desperate to work that they
had to accept zero-hours contracts
and were on tap at their employer’s
convenience also may be over.
In the jobs market there is now a
clear division, almost an apartheid,
between those who can and those
who can never work from home.
Working from home — involving at
least hybrid working — is now a
permanent condition for almost
40 per cent of people, according to
the Office for National Statistics. The
post-pandemic rush to return to the
office when restrictions were lifted
barely happened and there is
tentative evidence that it has gone
into reverse.
For some sectors of the economy,
including hospitality but also others,
the return to normality has not
happened. The latest official
estimates show that consumer-facing
services are at 6.3 per cent below pre-
pandemic levels, a shortfall that is
developing into a permanent hit.
Experts say aviation in Europe will
take another two years to get back to
pre-pandemic levels, but even that is
dependent on there being enough
people to take on the dull and
repetitive jobs working unsocial hours
in airport security, passport control
and baggage-handling.
Not only did the pandemic bring
forward the working-from-home
revolution, it also gave many people
an opportunity to try something else
in a way they would not have
done in normal
circumstances. That
includes workers
who were
furloughed by
their employer. It
gave them a
chance of
freedom. For
older workers,
with nearly
three million
over-50s
furloughed while
the scheme was
running, the pandemic
provided a chance to
reconsider their lives. Being on
furlough convinced some that
retirement might not be such a bad
thing. It may have provided a smooth
path towards it.
I have written on a couple of
occasions here about the four-day-
week movement, which, like working
from home, creates labour market
“haves” and “have-nots”. Some
employers will offer four-day weeks
and some jobs lend themselves to it.
For others, it is not an option.
While some would say that four-
day weeks have been bypassed by
working from home, in which it is
sometimes said that workers operate
on a TWT — Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday — schedule that is not their
contractual obligation. This week 70
firms employing 3,300 people in all
began a six-month four-day week
pilot scheme, with no loss of pay for
employees. If it works, it could be a
powerful recruitment tool.
Surely, despite these developments,
economic reality including the cost-
of-living crisis will bite and force
some back into work, including into
those hard-to-fill jobs? But once older
workers have chosen retirement, it
may be hard to get them back. There
has been a substantial increase in
inactivity owing to long-term sickness
and Long Covid may be affecting as
many as two million people.
Reduced employment among
young people, some of which reflects
full-time students who traditionally
hold down part-time jobs, may also be
a longer-term change. In addition,
more than 600,000 of the
economically inactive in the 16-to-24
age bracket are not in full-time
education. The EU nationals who
have left will not be coming back.
These are not teething troubles. We
have taken the availability of workers
for granted and for too long
assumed that an invisible hand
ensures there are enough people for
the jobs that have to be filled. That is
not the case now, and may not be for
some time. For some sectors,
chronic recruitment difficulties will
come with the territory. They will
damage or destroy
many businesses,
and they will
damage the
economy.
‘‘
’’
David Smith is Economics Editor of
The Sunday Times
[email protected]
George Magnus is a research associate
at Oxford University’s China Centre
and at SOAS and is the author of Red
Flags: why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy
China’s growth miracle
increasingly looks as if
it’s coming to an end
‘The private sector
and entrepreneurs are
being coerced into
pursuing party goals’
Labour shortages and home working
will permanently reshape the economy
o
omy
a
done in nor
circumst
includ
who
fur
th
ga
ch
fr
o
w
thr
ove
ffurlo
ttthe sch
running,
provided a c