The EconomistJuly 22nd 2017 3
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
SPECIAL REPORT
A list of sources is at
Economist.com/specialreports
CONTENTS
5 History of the conflict
Post-partum depression
6 Kashmir
Vale of darkness
7 India
The elephant in its labyrinth
8 Pakistan
The pushmi-pullyu
10 China
One Lifebelt, One Road
11 Prospects for peace
Don’t hold your breath
1
EVERY AFTERNOON AT sunset, at a point midway along the arrow-
straight road between Amritsar and Lahore, rival squads of splendidly
uniformed soldiers strut and stomp a 17th-century British military drill
known as Beating Retreat (pictured). Barked commands, fierce glares and
preposterously high kicks all signal violent intent. But then, lovingly and
in unison, the enemies lower their national flags. Opposing guardsmen
curtly shake hands, and the border gates roll shut forthe night.
As India and Pakistan celebrate their twin 70th birthday this Au-
gust, the frontier post of Wagah reflects the profound dysfunction in their
relations. On its side Pakistan has built a multi-tiered amphitheatre for
the boisterous crowds that come to watch the show. The Indians, no less
rowdy, have gone one better with
a half-stadium for 15,000. But the
number of travellers who actually
cross the border here rarely ex-
ceeds a few hundred a week.
Wagah’s silly hats and
walks serve a serious function.
The cuckoo-clock regularity of
the show; the choreographed
complicity between the two
sides; and the fact that the sol-
diers and crowds look, act and
talk very much the same—all this
has the reassuring feel of a sport-
ing rivalry between teams. No
matter how bad things get be-
tween us, the ritual seems to say,
we know it is just a game. Alas,
the game between India and
Pakistan has often turned serious.
After the exhaustion of the
second world war Britain was
faced with two claimants to its
restless Indian empire, a huge
masala of ethnic, linguistic and
religious groups (half of which was administered directly and half as
“princely states” under 565 hereditary rulers subject to the British crown).
Just about everyone wanted independence. But whereas the Congress
Party of Mahatma Gandhi envisioned a unified federal state, the Muslim
League of Muhammad Ali Jinnah argued that the subcontinent’s 30%
Muslim minority constituted a separate nation thatrisked oppression
under a Hindu majority. Communal riots prompted Britain’slast viceroy,
Lord Mountbatten, to make a hasty decision. He split the country in
two—or rather three, since the new state of Pakistan came in two parts, di-
vided by the 2,000km (1,240-mile) expanse of the new state of India.
When the two new states were proclaimed in mid-August 1947, it
was hoped the partition would be orderly. Lines had been drawn on
maps, and detailed lists ofpersonnel and assets, down to the instru-
ments in army bands, had been assigned to each side. But the plans im-
mediately went awry in a vast, messyand violent exchange of popula-
tions that left at least 1m dead and 15m uprooted from their homes.
Within months a more formal war had erupted. It ended by tearing
the former princely state of Kashmir in two, making its 750km-long por-
tion of the border a perpetual subject of dispute. Twice more, in 1965 and
Hissing cousins
Three score and ten years after their acrimonious split, India and
Pakistan remain at daggers drawn. Max Rodenbeck asks if they can
ever make up
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people helped in the prep-
aration of this report. Apart from
those mentioned in the text, the
author would particularly like to
thank Mallika Ahluwalia, Attiq
Ahmed, Razi Ahmed, Aitzaz Ahsan,
Cyril Almeida, Yacoob Khan Bangash,
Mirza Ashraf Beg, Bim Bissell, Narita
Farhan, Shehryar Fazli, Abbas
Hassan, Khurram Husain, Jugnu
Mohsin, Ahmed and Angeles Rashid,
Najam Sethi, Fatma Shah, Malvika
and Tejbir Singh, Mir Mohammad Ali
Talpur, Khawaja Maaz Tariq, Zia Ur
Rehman, Milan Vaishnav and Omar
Waraich.
Missing map? Sadly, India censors
maps that show the current effective
border, insisting instead that only its
full territorial claims be shown.
It is more intolerant on this issue
than either China or Pakistan. Indian
readers will therefore probably be
deprived of the maps on the second
and fourth pages of this special
report. Unlike their government, we
think our Indian readers can face
political reality. Those who want to
see an accurate depiction of the
various territorial claims can do so
using our interactive map at
Economist.com/asianborders