The EconomistJuly 22nd 2017 9
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
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1
SPECIAL REPORT
open late, and on its bustling streetswomen mingle more com-
fortably with men than in strait-laced Lahore, Pakistan’s inland
metropolis 1,000km to the north. For those who live in the port
city’s expansive seaside suburbs, there are further compensa-
tions: bighouses with poolside bars, bevies of servants and, be-
hind high walls and security guards, night spots as fancy as any
in Dubai or Mumbai.
Pakistan has far fewer billionaires than India does, but feu-
dal habits are more ingrained. Miftah Ismail, chairman of the
Board of Investment, reckons that the country, with a workforce
of 65m, has around 10m domestic servants. “People talk about Is-
lam and forget about class motivation,” says Aatish Taseer, a
New York-based writer who is half Indian, half Pakistani. “You’d
think they would have done awaywith caste since everyone’s
Muslim, but it lurks everywhere just belowthe surface.”
One caste that doesnicely is the army. Officially, Pakistan’s
annual defence spending runs to a modest $8bn, or 2.6% ofGDP,
but that does not include officers’ generous pensions, which ac-
cording to SIPRI, a Swedish think-tank, push the total closer to
4%. Further spending may be hidden in Pakistan’sunusually
large budgetallocations for contingent liabilities. A range of in-
dustries owned by the armed forces, as well as of army-operated
trusts such as the Fauji Foundation, a holding group with de-
clared assets of$3.3bn in 2015, also fall outside the budget.
The army is Pakistan’sbiggest property developer, too. Its
Defence Housing Authorities own large tracts of prime land in
every city, including 35 square kilometres along Karachi’s water-
front and a chunk of Lahore’s exclusive eastern suburbsamount-
ing to a quarter of the city’s area, complete with golf clubs, shop-
ping malls and business parks. “They treat us very well here, you
see,” says a former general, explaining why he retired to Lahore
rather than join some of his family in England.
Such privilege also explainsthe army’s interest in sustain-
ing the sense of threat, and in keeping Pakistan’s politicians in
check. There are many ways of doing this. Political parties—many
of which are said to have been incubated by the army for this
purpose—tend to pander to the army. The police and courts keep
a respectful distance. And the army’s media wing exerts a pow-
erful influence on the press. Whereas some private television
channels are seen aseager mouthpieces, others face pressures
that range from reprimands on the phone to threats and unfortu-
nate incidents.
Given the opacity and unaccountability of the “deep state,”
it is not surprising that many Pakistanis see its hand behind the
proliferation of extremist religious groups. In response to terro-
rist attacks such as one on a boys’ school in Peshawar in 2014 that
left 141 dead, the army has increasingly taken the offensive
against groups that challenge the state. But other, equally radical
outfits that direct violence at foreign enemies or at perceived do-
mestic troublemakers continue to evade punishment. In private,
journalists and politicians worry that harsh laws making blas-
phemy punishable bydeath, which have inspired more than one
murderous vigilante attack, are being left in place to discourage
dissent in general.
Crack of Dawn
In the face of such constraints, Pakistan’s public life remains
remarkably vibrant. Indian journalists expressed grudging ad-
miration last yearwhen Dawn, a Pakistani English-language
daily, published embarrassing details of a closed meeting be-
tween top military and civilian leaders. The politicians were
quoted as warning the generals that Pakistan risked diplomatic
isolation if the army did not rein in specific extremist groups.
An equally telling exchange came in April this year when
Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister, fired a top adviser in an appar-
ent gesture to placate the army over what had become known as
the Dawnleaks. The general in charge of the army’spublic rela-
tions riposted with a curt tweet saying this was not good enough.
Much of Pakistan’s press angrily declared that the army should
answer to elected leaders, not the other way around. A week lat-
er the general withdrew his tweet.
Still, in the test of wills between civilians and the armed
forces, it is the generals who retain the upper hand. The army has
not taken action against the militants named in the Dawnleaks
but has come up with a counter-narrative, suggestingthe breach
proves that civilians cannot be trusted with state secrets. Mr Sha-
rif, for his part, remains vulnerable. He faces ongoing investiga-
tions into evidence, leaked in the Panama papers that exposed
details of thousands of offshore bank accounts, that his family
bought luxury properties in London.
Mr Sharif’s centre-right party is still widely expected to
hold on to power in elections due next year. It has a virtual
stranglehold on the Punjab, home to nearly half the country’s
population. The rival centre-left Pakistan Peoples Party remains
strong in the second-most-populous province, Sindh, but has
been tarnished by corruption charges. A relative upstart, the
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf orPTI, led by Imran Khan, does well in
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, a largely Pashto-speaking province. But
despite Mr Khan’s cricket-star appeal and his anti-corruption
platform, his party has made little headway elsewhere. A dozen
smaller parties represent particular ethnic or religious groups.
So after 70 years as a nation Pakistan still lacks a truly na-
Be prepared
Sources: IISS; SIPRI
Military capabilities, 2016
Armed forces Pakistan India
Active, m 0.7 1.4
Reserves, m na 1.2
Paramilitary, m 0.3 1.4
Nuclear warheads 110-130 100-120
Defence budget, $ (% of GDP) 7.5 bn (2.6) 51.1 bn (2.3)
Karachi
does feel
relaxed, if
slightly
battered.
Shops stay
open late,
and on its
bustling
streets
women
mingle
comfortably
with men